S2 Actual reading list

Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War

Rick Atkinson

A definitive account of the Gulf War told by Pulitzer Prize–winning correspondent Rick Atkinson. This previously untold story of the US war with Iraq in the early 1990s, Atkinson follows the 42-day war from the first night to the final day, providing vivid accounts of bombing runs, White House strategy sessions, firefights, and bitter internal conflicts.

Dragon Days: Time for "Unconventional" Tactics

H. John Poole

This book shows how to control a contested region with squad-sized outposts . North Vietnam and Iran have done it. Now, North Korea may try to consolidate the South with such a strategy. Scores of tiny Western outposts could do this too. After a short threat assessment, Dragon Days describes what a single U.S. rifle squad must do to safely accomplish such a mission in Asia. It will need the following Unconventional Warfare (UW) (1) some police procedure; (2) obscurely defending; (3) finding an enemy weakness; (4) making a secret approach; (5) disguising the attack; (6) precluding a counterstroke; (7) rural E&E; (8) enhancing rural terrain (9) urban E&E; and (10) enhancing urban terrain . Because of Asia's bottom-up culture, the little picture is where such an ability originates. This heavily illustrated book contains more small-unit perspective than any U.S. govt. publication. In fact, it may still constitute America's only UW tactical-technique manual .

Expeditionary Eagles: Outmaneuvering the Taliban

H. John Poole

Posterity Press · 2010

The Afghan War is still salvagable. For America, it has been about denying sanctuary to al-Qaeda. For local factions and governments, a traditional fund raiser--heroin--is more important. Only with less smuggling of drugs out and ordnance in, can the insurgency be limited. Both have been broken down into more easily concealable "pieces." All traffic along the 14 entrance highways must be better inspected to curtail their movement. Herein lies the most detailed study in existence of Pakistan's drug and militant madrasa networks. Also discussed is how a lone U.S. squad could--without a single artillery round or drone missile--rely on deception to defend a roadside outpost against hundreds of attacking narco-insurgents.

Militant Tricks: Battlefield Ruses of the Islamic Insurgent

H. John Poole

Posterity Press · October 17, 2005

THIS BOOK WAS ON THE U.S. ARMY'S MOST PRESTIGIOUS READING LIST. Since 9/11, our deployed troops have learned many things. Though the war in Afghanistan has just ended, many of their hard-won lessons have yet to be assimilated by the Stateside bureaucracy. To help, "Militant Tricks" has recounted America's progress in Iraq and Afghanistan from the standpoint of East Asian BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION. Both countries were part of the Mongol Empire for over 200 years and thus prone to every sort of ancient Chinese illusion. "Militant Tricks" also contains the TACTICAL TECHNIQUES WITH WHICH TO COUNTER AN ISLAMIC EXTREMIST'S URBAN OFFENSIVE. While some of these nontraditional techniques were risked during the Baghdad Surge, they may soon be forgotten.

Military Innovation in the Interwar Period

Williamson Murray

Cambridge University Press · 1998

This study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s explores differences in innovating exploitation by the seven major military powers. This volume of comparative essays investigates how and why innovation occurred or did not occur, and explains much of the strategic and operative performance of the Axis and Allies in World War II.

The Crucible of War Book 3: Montgomery and Alamein

Barrie Pitt

The Crucible of War Book 3 ‘Masterly and lucid in its descriptions not only of the fighting and strategy, but of the political machinations’ Sunday Telegraph Throughout the first half of the Second World War, control of the inhospitable North African desert was strategically vital for the Allies. In the middle of 1942, the outcome hung in the balance. Rommel and his Afrika Korps had been fought to a standstill at the first battle of Alamein and were desperately short of fuel and equipment. But the British and Commonwealth forces were in little better shape. The next encounter between the two armies would however be decisive. Montgomery, the new Allied commander, set about rebuilding his weary army and establishing an overwhelming superiority in both men and material. The scene was set for a second, and bludgeoning, encounter at El Alamein in October. It was to prove Britain’s first decisive victory of the war. Montgomery and Alamein is the third volume of Barrie Pitt’s definitive history of the Desert War. The first and second volumes, Wavell’s Command and Auchinleck’s Command, are also published by Sharpe Books. Barrie Pitt is also the author of Zeebrugge, Coronel & Falkland the history of the Special Boat Squadron. Praise for the Crucible of War Trilogy: ‘Barrie Pitt tells this exciting history well. He has assembled a mass of information and organised it with admirable clarity. His narrative is scrupulously accurate in detail. The whole work will have great appeal for the general reader.’ Times Literary Supplement ‘The definitive work on the Desert War.’ Manchester Evening News ‘A magnificent book, Barrie Pitt has almost a novelist’s skill and perception of character.’ Daily Telegraph ‘Totally readable, Mr Pitt’s study depicts equally well the broad outlines of strategy, the confusions and hazards of the battlefield and the personalities of the generals or private soldiers fighting there.’ Oxford Times

The Crucible of War: The Complete Volumes

Barrie Pitt

‘The definitive work on the Desert War.’ Manchester Evening News WAVELL’S Volume 1 of The Crucible of War trilogy covers General Wavell’s command, a period that began triumphantly with the rout of the Italian Army and ended in catastrophe with the devastating entry of Rommel into the conflict. On 11th June 1940, Mussolini declared war on Britain and France. From their colony in Libya, the Italians began invading Egypt in an attempt to expand their African Empire. Thus began the Desert War – a battle to secure critical Middle East oil supplies which would last for three years. Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East was General Sir Archibald Wavell. By 1940, and with limited resources, he was responsible for all British land forces in Egypt, the Sudan, Palestine, Transjordan and Cyprus, as well as the Army formations in British Somaliland, Aden, Iraq and along the shores of the Persian Gulf. Attack was the only form of defence and under field commander General Richard O’Connor, an immensely successful and exhilarating campaign was carried out against Marshal Graziani’s forces. The Italians were pushed back hundreds of miles and 130,000 prisoners were taken. By February 1941 nearly all Axis forces had been expelled from North Africa. It was a remarkable triumph in one of the most dramatic theatres of the Second World War. AUCHINLECK’S Volume Two of The Crucible of War trilogy covers General Auchinleck’s command — a period of disaster and defeat for the British Army, driven back towards Cairo by the Africa Korps under the tactical genius of Rommel. The book ends however with the replacing of Auchinleck by Montgomery in August 1942. Auchinleck's Command is essential reading for anyone interested in WW2, the British Army (it's strengths and weaknesses) and military leadership. MONTGOMERY AND Throughout the first half of the Second World War, control of the inhospitable North African desert was strategically vital for the Allies. In the middle of 1942, the outcome hung in the balance. Rommel and his Afrika Korps had been fought to a standstill at the first battle of Alamein and were desperately short of fuel and equipment. The next encounter between the two armies would be decisive. The scene was set for a second, and bludgeoning, encounter at El Alamein in October. It was to prove Britain’s first decisive victory of the war. Praise for the Crucible of War ‘Barrie Pitt tells this exciting history well. He has assembled a mass of information and organised it with admirable clarity. His narrative is scrupulously accurate in detail. The whole work will have great appeal for the general reader.’ Times Literary Supplement ‘Masterly and lucid in its descriptions not only of the fighting and strategy, but of the political machinations’ Sunday Telegraph ‘A magnificent book, Barrie Pitt has almost a novelist’s skill and perception of character.’ Daily Telegraph ‘Comes as close as any work yet published to being a definitive account of the battles between German and Allied armies in the Sahara.’ Financial Times Barrie Pitt (1918-2006) was well known as a military historian and editor of Purnell’s History of the Second Wor

The Roots Of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt And German Military Reform

James S. Corum

University Press of Kansas · February 1994

Following Germany's defeat in World War I, the Germans signed the Versailles Treaty, superficially agreeing to limit their war powers. The Allies envisioned the future German army as a lightly armed border guard and international security force. The Germans had other plans. As early as 1919, James Corum contends, the tactical foundations were being laid for the Nazi Blitzkrieg. Between 1919 and 1933, German military leaders created and nurtured the Reichswehr, a new military organization built on the wreckage of the old Imperial Army. It was not being groomed for policing purposes. Focusing on Hans von Seeckt, General Staff Chief and Army Commander, Corum traces the crucial transformations in German military tactical doctrine, organization, and training that laid the foundations for fighting Germany's future wars. In doing so, he restores balance to prior assessment of von Seeckt's influence and demonstrates how the general, along with a few other "visionary" officers--including armor tactician Ernst Volckheim and air tactician Helmut Wilberg--collaborated to develop the core doctrine for what became the Blitzkrieg. The concepts of mobile war so essential to Germany's strength in World War II, Corum shows, were in place well before the tools became available. As an unforeseen consequence of the Versailles Treaty, the Germans were not saddled with a stockpile of outdated equipment as the Allies were. This, ironically, resulted in an advantage for the Germans, who were able to create doctrine first and design equipment to match it.

The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century

Thomas X. Hammes

Zenith Press · February 17, 2006

4GW (Fourth Generation Warfare) is the only kind of war America has ever lost. And we have done so three times - in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia. This form of warfare has also defeated the French in Vietnam and Algeria, and the USSR in Afghanistan.As the only Goliath left in the world, we should be worried that the world's Davids have found a sling and stone that work." - Chapter 1, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. The War in Iraq. The War on Terror. These types of "asymmetrical" warfare are the conflicts of the 21st century - and show how difficult it is for the world's remaining superpower to battle insurgents and terrorists who will fight unconventionally in the face of superior military power. This change in military conflict may seem sudden.

Perfect Spy: The Incredible Double Life of Pham Xuan An - Time Magazine Reporter and Vietnamese Communist Agent

Larry Berman

Collins · April 24, 2007

During the Vietnam War, Time reporter Pham Xuan An befriended everyone who was anyone in Saigon, including American journalists such as David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan, the CIA's William Colby, and the legendary Colonel Edward Lansdale—not to mention the most influential members of the South Vietnamese government and army. None of them ever guessed that he was also providing strategic intelligence to Hanoi, smuggling invisible ink messages into the jungle inside egg rolls. His early reports were so accurate that General Giap joked, "We are now in the U.S. war room." For more than twenty years, An lived a dangerous lie—and no one knew it because he was a master of both his jobs. After the war, An was named a Hero of the People's Army and was promoted to general—one of only two intelligence officers to ever achieve that rank. In Perfect Spy, Larry Berman, who An considered his official American biographer, chronicles the extraordinary life of one of the twentieth century's most fascinating spies. In doing so, he offers a new perspective on a war that continues to haunt us.

Phantom Soldier: The Enemy's Answer to U.S. Firepower

H. John Poole

Posterity Press · August 9, 2001

"Phantom Soldier" is now on the U.S. Army's most prestigious pre-deployment reading list for a reason. It won't please those who have come to believe that wars are won and casualties limited through technology, or that the victor's version of one is always correct. But, all U.S. security personnel should read it. Possibly the West's best treatise on Oriental warfare, it sheds new light on what Asian infantry can do: (1) alternate between guerrilla, mobile, and positional warfare; (2) use "ordinary forces" to engage and "extraordinary forces [infiltrators]" to defeat; and then (3) retreat to save lives. What occurred in history doesn't change, but one's perception of it does--as he comes to better understand his former foe. Here's what really happened at Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, Chosin Reservoir, and Hue City. Those who believe this book's cover art to be fantasy have only to google the term "dac cong." Through how the NVA held their own without resupply, tanks, artillery, or air power, U.S. grunts could better survive the more lethal enemy weaponry of the 21st Century.

Stealth: The Secret Contest to Invent Invisible Aircraft

Peter Westwick

Oxford University Press, Incorporated · 2020

The story behind the technology that revolutionized both aeronautics, and the course of history On a moonless night in January 1991, a dozen airplanes appeared in the skies over Baghdad. Or, rather, didn't appear. They arrived in the dark, their black outlines cloaking them from sight. More importantly, their odd, angular shapes, which made them look like flying origami, rendered them undetectable to Iraq's formidable air defenses. Stealth technology, developed during the decades before Desert Storm, had arrived. To American planners and strategists at the outset of the Cold War, this seemingly ultimate way to gain ascendance over the USSR was only a question. What if the United States could defend its airspace while at the same time send a plane through Soviet skies undetected? A craft with such capacity would have to be essentially invisible to radar - an apparently miraculous feat of physics and engineering. In Stealth, Peter Westwick unveils the process by which the impossible was achieved. At heart, Stealth is a tale of two aerospace companies, Lockheed and Northrop, and their fierce competition - with each other and with themselves - to obtain what was estimated one of the largest procurement contracts in history. Westwick's book fully explores the individual and collective ingenuity and determination required to make these planes and in the process provides a fresh view of the period leading up to the end of the Soviet Union. Taking into account the role of technology, as well as the art and science of physics and engineering, Westwick offers an engaging narrative, one that immerses readers in the race to produce a weapon that some thought might save the world, and which certainly changed it.

Strategic Humanism: Lessons on Leadership from the Ancient Greeks

Claudia Hauer

Strategic Humanism takes the reader through the works of Homer, Herodotus, Thucydides, and Aristotle, laying out in clear and accessible terms their thoughts on leadership, war, and their relationship to individuals, nations, culture, and technology. In so doing, the book traces the path of ancient Greek democracy from infancy to maturity, culminating in the Athenian demise. Throughout, Hauer holds up the political, cultural, literary, and philosophical milieu of ancient Greece as a kind of looking glass to our present era of rapid technological change and democratic malaise.

The John Boyd Roundtable: Debating Science, Strategy, and War

Mark Safranski

Nimble Books · 2008-09-16

A collection of thought-provoking essays about the work of the late Colonel John Boyd, a fighter pilot who was one of the most influential figures in American military strategy in the last third of the Twentieth Century. This book had its origins in an online roundtable hosted at Chicago Boyz, a popular libertarian and conservative group blog founded by Jonathan Glewirtz. The roundtable attracted the participation of an impressive group of reviewers from the blogosphere and from scientific, academic and military fields. Authors whose essays are included in this book include Daniel H. Abbott, Shane Deichman, Adam Elkus, "Lexington Green," Frank Hoffman, Dr. Frans Osinga, Dr. Chet Richards, Thomas Wade, and Dr. Frans Osinga, author of the leading scholarly work on Boyd. This book is essential reading for anyone interested in John Boyd and will provide important insights for anyone who is interested in military strategy and current affairs.

The Longest War: A History of the War on Terror and the Battles with Al Qaeda Since 9/11

Peter L. Bergen

Free Press · 2011

TEN YEARS HAVE PASSED since the shocking attacks on the World Trade Center, and after seven years of conflict, the last U.S. combat troops left Iraq—only to move into Afghanistan, where the ten-year-old fight the war on terror rages with no clear end in sight. In The Longest War Peter Bergen offers a comprehensive history of this war and its evolution, from the strategies devised in the wake of the 9/11 attacks to the fighting in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and beyond. Unlike any other book on this subject, here Bergen tells the story of this shifting war’s failures and successes from the perspectives of both the United States and al-Qaeda and its allies. He goes into the homes of al-Qaeda members, rooting into the source of their devotion to terrorist causes, and spends time in the offices of the major players shaping the U.S. strategic efforts in the region. At a time when many are frustrated or fatigued with what has become an enduring multigenerational conflict, this book will provide an illuminating narrative that not only traces the arc of the fight but projects its likely future. Weaving together internal documents from al-Qaeda and the U.S. offices of counterterrorism, first-person interviews with top-level jihadists and senior Washington officials, along with his own experiences on the ground in the Middle East, Bergen balances the accounts of each side, revealing how al-Qaeda has evolved since 9/11 and the specific ways the U.S. government has responded in the ongoing fight. Bergen also uncovers the strategic errors committed on both sides—the way that al-Qaeda’s bold attack on the United States on 9/11 actually undermined its objective and caused the collapse of the Taliban and the destruction of the organization’s safe haven in Afghanistan, and how al-Qaeda is actually losing the war of ideas in the Muslim world. The book also shows how the United States undermined its moral position in this war with its actions at Guantánamo and coercive interrogations—including the extraordinary rendition of Abu Omar, who was kidnapped by the CIA in Milan in 2003 and was tortured for four years in Egyptian prisons; his case represents the first and only time that CIA officials have been charged and convicted of the crime of kidnapping. In examining other strategic blunders the United States has committed, Bergen offers a scathing critique of the Clinton and Bush administrations’ inability to accurately assess and counter the al-Qaeda threat, Bush’s deeply misguided reasons for invading Iraq—including the story of how the invasion was launched based, in part, on the views of an obscure academic who put forth theories about Iraq’s involvement with al-Qaeda—and the Obama administration’s efforts in Afghanistan. At a critical moment in world history The Longest War provides the definitive account of the ongoing battle against terror.

Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization

Jonathan M. House

University Press of the Pacific · July 2002

Book by House, Jonathan M.

War In The Shadows: The Guerrilla in History

Robert B. Asprey

Backinprint.com · May 2002

Ranging from Alexander the Great's battles with Asiatic Scythians, through the Russian Revolution, and on up to the turmoil in the Middle East and the battle in Northern Ireland, War in the Shadows is a book of monumental sweep and singular perspective. It also contains a comprehensive and hard-hitting strategic evaluation of the Vietnam War-one of the most significant analyses of "the war that won't go away." War in the Shadows tells the story of the countries currently torn by armed insurgencies and clarifies the causes of each conflict. It provides the broad viewpoint necessary for understanding them in the historical terms of guerilla warfare. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and a highly unstable "new world order," this brand of rebellion has never been more powerful and potentially disruptive. As the author states in his Foreword, "For a number of reasons guerilla warfare has evolved into an ideal instrument for the realization of social-political-economic aspirations of underprivileged peoples. This is so patently true as to allow one to suggest that we may be witnessing a transition to a new era in warfare, an era as radically different as those of which followed the writings of Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and Mahan." War in the Shadows is crucial to understanding the complex challenges of our new and dangerous era.

Air Force Advising and Assistance: Developing Airpower in Client States (Modern Military History)

Donald Stoker

Helion and Company · Sep 20, 2018

The increased focus on counterinsurgency warfare and US nation building efforts after the attacks of 11 September 2001 reignited interest in military advising within military and other government organizations, private think tanks, and defense related contractors. Most studies on the subject, based on the chronological scope and numerical preponderance of ground advising missions, has quite naturally focused on these past efforts. Less attention has been given to air or naval advisory missions. This work seeks in part to help redress this current imbalance by examining a number of historical case studies dealing with air advisory efforts. By examining a number of historical case studies, this volume analyzes the challenges and opportunities inherent in aerial advisory efforts and offers insights into the methods by which such missions succeed or fail. Air advisory missions date almost to the first days of powered flight. Air advisory efforts have a number of unique elements based on the fundamental role of advanced technology and the extensive resource requirements associated with aviation operations. For example, air advisory efforts are profoundly influenced by the types of aircraft involved and the types of mission flown. Likewise, the issues of maintenance support and the infrastructure needed for these missions plays a key role in determining capabilities available to the host nation. In the case of infrastructure, airfields, fuelling depots, maintenance and repair facilities, and radar and communications equipment offer a few of the most obvious requirements to support flight operations. The early history of advisory efforts reveal issues that remain relevant today, including questions related to the nature of aerial technology to be shared, the type of training to be provided, and the potential economic benefits that might accrue to the donor nation as a result of the sale of aviation technology to the host country. In many respects, air advisory efforts raise a number of profound strategic questions for the donor nation. Among others, these questions relate to the type of technology to be shared, the nature of training to be given, the role of foreign advisors in operations, the issue of infrastructure development and auxiliary training programs, the preparation of foreign advisors for their duties, and perhaps most significantly the development of the type of capabilities required to address the host nation’s security environment. Via a series of historical case studies, this volume explores these questions and others.

Military Deception and Strategic Surprise! (Volume 0)

John Gooch

Routledge · June 1, 2007

First published in 2007. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Military Deception: Hiding The Real - Showing The Fake - Denial Operations, Propaganda, Disinformation, Joint Doctrine, Soviet Maskirovka, Desert Storm Persian Gulf War Examples

U.S. Government

Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this book discusses military deception techniques and history. "Military deception" is an umbrella term that includes both denial and deception. Denial hides the real and deception shows the fake. Denial and deception are operations; propaganda and disinformation are the products. Joint doctrine says that military deception, as applied by a joint force commander (JFC), targets an adversary's decision-making process. Ultimately, the intent is to shape the adversary's behavior in the JFC's favor or to cause an adversary to form an inaccurate impression of the battlespace. Consequently, planning for deception operations depends on intelligence and security for success. Obviously, a commander wants to conceal deception efforts from the enemy, but often he'll conceal all or some of his efforts from his own troops to prevent confusion and/or compromise of the plan. During the early years of Soviet involvement in World War II, mishandling of information by soldiers and planners resulted in the compromise of many maskirovka (or deception) operations. As a result, the Soviets implemented aggressive security measures to protect their deception plans. Specifically, Soviet commanders restricted the number of planners and documents involved in the deception operations and communicated to subordinates only what they needed to know, when they needed to know it. The general enjoyed his breakfast while reading his morning paper and listening to the international news channel. Hearing the Balkans mentioned—his area of responsibility—he looked up as a foreign correspondent began to comment on the aftermath of an Allied bombing mission from the day before. The gruesome details suddenly made the general's scrambled eggs a bit less appealing. The graphic pictures showed what appeared to be the remnants of an orphanage. There in the rubble lay a bloodstained, tattered doll. Those images left him wondering about the carnage that lay beneath the collapsed brick and mortar. Had his staff miscalculated and inadvertently struck an orphanage? A similar misstep had occurred a few weeks ago when another bombing mission resulted in civilian casualties in a marketplace. As the general bemoaned the potential ramifications of accidentally bombing an orphanage, a memory surfaced. Years of flying high-performance aircraft had sharpened his senses, and something about the scene seemed familiar. Could that be the same bloodstained doll he had seen in photographs of the earlier marketplace mishap? The general had been briefed on the enemy's rather low-tech yet successful use of deception. Was he, along with the rest of the world, a target of military deception? As he pondered this, his pager went off. This fictitious example illustrates both how easy it is to manipulate the media in deception operations and how a thorough understanding of deception can help prevent a military leader from falling victim to it. The U.S. military is transforming itself with technological advancements in warfighting capability. Weapon systems, force structure and training have all improved. The amount and kind of information available to the warfighter is also improving. But even a technologically advanced nation like the United States is susceptible to deception. Analysis of friendly and enemy deception techniques in Operations DESERT STORM and ALLIED FORCE shows the main U.S. vulnerabilities to include its insatiable appetite for "news," the lack of deception-detection expertise in the military, and the tendency to believe that technological advancements make a nation deception-proof. Therefore, the key to mitigating the U.S. vulnerabilities to deception lies in educating the media about the military and common deception practices, giving the military intensive deception-detection training, and abandoning the notion that technolo

Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East, 1942-1943 (Modern War Studies)

Joel S.A. Hayward

University Press of Kansas · September 2001

By the time Hitler declared war on the Soviet Union in 1941, he knew that his military machine was running out of fuel. In response, he launched Operation Blau, a campaign designed to protect Nazi oilfields in Rumania while securing new ones in the Caucasus. All that stood in the way was Stalingrad. Most accounts of the Battle of Stalingrad have focused on the dismal fate of the German Army. Joel Hayward now chronicles Luftwaffe operations during that campaign, focusing on Hitler's use of the air force as a tactical rather than strategic weapon in close support of ground forces. He vividly details the Luftwaffe's key role as flying artillery, showing that the army relied on Luftwaffe support to a far greater degree than has been previously revealed and that its successes in the East occurred largely because of the effectiveness of that support. Hayward analyzes this major German offensive from the standpoint of cooperation between ground and air forces to attain mutually agreed objectives. He draws on diaries of both key commanders and regular airmen to recreate crucial battles and convey the drama of Hitler's frustrations and reckless leadership. Ultimately, Hayward shows, the poorly conceived strategies of Hitler, Goering, and others in Berlin doomed the efforts of air commander Wolfram von Richthofen, a courageous and resolute leader attempting to come to grips with an increasingly impossible situation. Stopped at Stalingrad is a dynamic case study in combined arms warfare that fills in many of the gaps left by other studies of the eastern war. By reconsidering the campaign in the light of a wider body of documentary sources and analyzing many previously ignored events, Hayward provides military historians and general readers a much deeper and more complete understanding of the Battle of Stalingrad and its impact on World War II.

Strategy

B.H. Liddell Hart

Meridian · 1991

"The most important book by one of the outstanding military authorities of our time." – Library Journal   This is the classic book on war as we know it. During his long life, Basil H. Liddell Hart was considered one of the world's foremost military thinkers--a man generally regarded as the "Clausewitz of the 20th century." Strategy is a seminal work of military history and theory, a perfect companion to Sun-tzu’s The Art of War and Carl von Clauswitz’s On War. Liddell Hart stressed movement, flexibility, and surprise. He saw that in most military campaigns dislocation of the enemy's psychological and physical balance is prelude to victory. This dislocation results from a strategic indirect approach. Reflect for a moment on the results of direct confrontation (trench war in WW I) versus indirect dislocation (Blitzkreig in WW II). Liddell Hart is also tonic for business and political planning: just change the vocabulary and his concepts fit.

The Doctrine of Fascism

Benito Mussolini

Howard Fertig · September 2006

“Democracy is a kingless regime infested by many kings who are sometimes more exclusive, tyrannical and destructive than one, even if he be a tyrant.” 'The Doctrine of Fascism' (Originally known as 'La dottrina del fascismo') is an essay written by Giovanni Gentile, with credit given to Benito Mussolini as a co-author. It was first published in the Enciclopedia Italiana of 1932, as the first section of a lengthy entry on "Fascismo" (Fascism). The entire entry on Fascism spans pages 847-884 of the Enciclopedia Italiana, and includes numerous photographs and graphic images. Today, it is considered the most complete articulation of Mussolini's political views. A key concept of the Mussolini essay was that fascism was a rejection of previous models: "Granted that the 19th century was the century of socialism, liberalism, democracy, this does not mean that the 20th century must also be the century of socialism, liberalism, democracy. Political doctrines pass; nations remain. We are free to believe that this is the century of authority, a century tending to the 'right', a Fascist century. If the 19th century was the century of the individual, we are free to believe that this is the 'collective' century, and therefore the century of the State." Regardless of one's political inclinations, this essay is of great curiosity to any reader with intellectual interests, and a must-read for those who seek to buttress or demolish its unwavering premises.

Blood Year: The Unraveling of Western Counterterrorism

David Kilcullen

Oxford University Press · 2016

2014 has the potential to go down as a crucial year in modern world history. A resurgent and bellicose Russia took over Crimea and fueled a civil war in Eastern Ukraine. Post-Saddam Iraq, in many respects a creature of the United States because of the war that began in 2003, lost a third of its territory to an army of hyper-violent millennialists. The peace process in Israel seemed to completely collapse. Finally, after coalescing in Syria as a territorial entity, the Islamic State swept into northern Iraq and through northeastern Syria, attracting legions of recruits from Europe and the Middle East. In short, the post-Cold War security order that the US had constructed after 1991 seemed to be coming apart at the seams. David Kilcullen was one of the architects of America's strategy in the late phases of the second Gulf War, and also spent time in Afghanistan and other hotspots. In Blood Year, he provides a wide-angle view of the current situation in the Middle East and analyzes how America and the West ended up in such dire circumstances. Whereas in 2008 it appeared that the U.S. might pull a modest stalemate from the jaws of defeat in Iraq, six years later the situation had reversed. After America pulled out of Iraq completely in 2011, the Shi'ite president cut Sunnis out of the power structure and allowed Iranian influence to grow. And from the debris of Assad's Syria arose an extremist Sunni organization even more radical than Al Qaeda. Unlike Al Qaeda, ISIS was intent on establishing its own state, and within a remarkably short time they did. Interestingly, Kilcullen highlights how embittered former Iraqi Ba'athist military officers were key contributors to ISIS's military successes. Kilcullen lays much of the blame on Bush's initial decision to invade Iraq (which had negative secondary effects in Afghanistan), but also takes Obama to task for simply withdrawing and adopting a "leading from behind" strategy. As events have proven, Kilcullen contends, withdrawal was a fundamentally misguided plan. The U.S. had uncorked the genie, and it had a responsibility to at least attempt to keep it under control. Instead, the U.S. is at a point where administration officials state that the losses of Ramadi and Palmyra are manageable setbacks. Kilcullen argues that the U.S. needs to re-engage in the region, whether it wants to or not, because it is largely responsible for the situation that is now unfolding. Blood Year is an essential read for anyone interested in understanding not only why the region that the U.S. invaded a dozen years ago has collapsed into utter chaos, but also what it can do to alleviate the grim situation.