AFDD 2-1.9, page 26

16 Cross, or with the governments of other nations. Such organizations may also hold veto power over targeting decisions made by military commanders. › There may be more direct interest in and influence on operations from high-level leadership such as unified combatant commanders, the Secretary of Defense, and the President. › There may be greater emphasis upon minimizing collateral damage (CD) and CD risk calculations may be scrutinized by higher-level leaders than in major combat operations. This concern for reduced CD usually results in stability operations having more restrictive ROE than typical major combat operations, and targeteers can expect a much larger restricted target list (RTL). All planners and operators must remain aware of greatly increased potential negative results of even a single misplaced weapon under these circumstances. › In many stability operations, lack of large numbers of viable identified targets drives the bulk of force application into dynamic targeting, such as that executed through close air support (CAS) or on-call air interdiction missions. This fact, coupled with the need for minimization of CD, puts added stress on the entire dynamic targeting “kill chain.” This requires airtight command and control for both the air and ground components, especially in situations where the bulk of force application occurs in small numbers of ground force troops-in-contact situations. Proper use of and coordination with elements such as the air support operations center (ASOC), the tactical air control party (TACP), and the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD), as well as clear and rapid communications into the CAOC operations division, are mandatory for success. › Kinetic actions may have to be more thoroughly integrated with non-kinetic means and may entail targeting combat actions quite close to areas where operations such as peace enforcement and humanitarian assistance are being conducted. › There may be a greater emphasis on timely tactical assessment of actions and upon thorough operational assessment on a shorter timeline than is customary in major combat operations. Interest in assessments may also come from higher leadership or non-military organizations.