AFDD 2-1.9, page 54
Targeting
Air Force Doctrine Document: Targeting
DTIC ADA454614 public copy
Searchable page text (OCR / PDF)
44
targets when necessary. Normally, targeting changes are needed due to adverse
weather, assessment requirements, or modification of priorities. The ability to quickly
recommend good alternate targets is very important to the flexibility of air and space
power. Combat operations targeteers should be aware of all significant information for
targets on the current ATO, desired effects and objectives, all guidance, ROEs, and
weaponeering lookup tables as appropriate. More on this topic can be found in the next
chapter.
The rational use of force relies on the capability to identify adversary entities as a
precursor to taking action against them, especially if doing so entails the use of force.
CID of all battlespace entities is thus a critical enabling capability in any use, or potential
use, of military force. Identifying adversary or enemy entities is essential, of course, but
so is identifying friendly and neutral entities. “Blue force tracking” (BFT) is a core
function of CID. BFT is the employment of techniques to identify and track US, allied,
and coalition forces for the purpose of providing commanders enhanced situational
awareness and reducing fratricide. For more information on CID and BFT, see AFTTP
3-1.1 (Secret), Appendix 2.
Results and Products of the Phase
This is the phase in which targets are actually struck (or otherwise affected) and
direct effects are created. Other products include physical damage assessments and
MISREPs, used in helping make physical damage and other assessments.
Assessment
Purpose of the Phase
Assessment is the measure of progress in a campaign or operation, the means of
telling whether desired effects are being created and objectives achieved, and of
evaluating what needs to be done next. Effective planning and execution require
continuing evaluation of the effectiveness of friendly and enemy action. Consequently,
assessment is much more than “battle damage” or “combat assessment,” as it has
traditionally been presented—and more than just an intelligence function that takes
place after execution has concluded. Planning for it begins prior to commencement of
operations, takes place throughout planning and execution, and continues after the
conflict is over. It is a central part of an effects-based approach to conflict. It consists of
four distinct levels: tactical assessment (which includes assessment of physical
damage), component-level operational assessment, CFC-level operational assessment,
and national-level assessment. Each lower level feeds the levels above it and provides
a basis for broader-based evaluation of progress. This subject is treated in detail in
Chapter Four.