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Military manual ATP 2-33.4 Page 28 of 146 text: ocr+pdf

ATP 2-33.4, page 28

Intelligence Analysis

Army Techniques Publication: Intelligence Analysis

2014 public edition (Archive.org)

Page 28 of ATP 2-33.4
Searchable page text (OCR / PDF)
Chapter 2 in his revolutionary days, Cuba would be democratic today” is contrary to fact. Besides being a gross oversimplification, the assumption made in the statement cannot be verified. © Misusing analogies occurs when one generalizes indiscriminately from analogy to real world. One method for weakening an analogous argument is by citing a counter-analogy. Analogies are strong tools that can impart understanding in a complex issue. In the absence of other evidence, intelligence analysts may reason from analogy. Such reasoning assumes that the characteristics and circumstances of the object or event being looked at are similar to the object or event in the analogy. 2-37. The strength of a conclusion drawn from similar situations is proportional to the degree of similarity between the situations. The danger in reasoning from analogy is assuming that because objects, events, or situations are alike in certain aspects, they are alike in all aspects. Conclusions drawn from analogies are inappropriately used when they are accepted as evidence of proof. Situations may often be similar in certain aspects, but not in others. A counter-analogy weakens the original analogy by citing other comparisons that can be made on the same basis. BIASES 2-38. A subjective viewpoint, bias indicates a preconceived notion about someone or something. Biases generally have a detrimental impact on intelligence analysis because they obscure the true nature of the information. Intelligence analysts must be able to recognize cultural, organizational, personal, and cognitive biases and be aware of the potential influence they can have on judgment. Cultural Bias 2-39. Americans see the world in a certain way. The inability to see things through the eyes of someone from another country or culture is cultural bias. Biases interfere with the analyst’s ability to think the way an enemy commander might think or to give policymakers informed advice on the likely reaction of foreign governments to American policy. Also known as mirror imaging, cultural bias attributes someone else’s intentions, actions, or reactions to the same kind of logic, cultural values, and thought processes as the individual analyzing the situation. Although cultural bias is difficult to avoid, the following measures can lessen its impact: e Locate individuals who understand the culture: = Include them in the analytical process. = Ask their opinion about likely responses to friendly actions. = Take care when using their opinions since they may be subject to biases regarding ethnic groups or cultures in the region and their knowledge may be dated or inaccurate. © Locate regional experts, such as foreign and regional area officers, who have lived or traveled through the area and are somewhat conversant regarding the culture. Assess the quality of the information provided against the level of knowledge and experience the individual has for that culture or region. Organizational Bias 2-40. Most organizations have specific policy goals or preconceived ideas. Analyses conducted within these organizations may not be as objective as the same type of analysis done outside the organization. Groupthink and best case are organizational biases that can significantly skew internal analysis. © Groupthink. This bias occurs when a judgment is unconsciously altered because of exposure to selective information and common viewpoints held among individuals. Involving people outside the organization in the analysis can help identify and correct this bias. e Best Case. This bias occurs when an analyst presents good news or bad news in the most optimistic light. The judgment is deliberately altered to provide only the information the commander wants to hear. Analysts can avoid this bias by having the moral courage to tell the commander the whole story, good and bad. 2-12 ATP 2-33.4 18 August 2014 Chapter 2 2-12 ATP 2-33.4 18 August 2014 in his revolutionary days, Cuba would be democratic today” is contrary to fact. Besides being a gross oversimplification, the assumption made in the statement cannot be verified.  Misusing analogies occurs when one generalizes indiscriminately from analogy to real world. One method for weakening an analogous argument is by citing a counter-analogy. Analogies are strong tools that can impart understanding in a complex issue. In the absence of other evidence, intelligence analysts may reason from analogy. Such reasoning assumes that the characteristics and circumstances of the object or event being looked at are similar to the object or event in the analogy. 2-37. The strength of a conclusion drawn from similar situations is proportional to the degree of similarity between the situations. The danger in reasoning from analogy is assuming that because objects, events, or situations are alike in certain aspects, they are alike in all aspects. Conclusions drawn from analogies are inappropriately used when they are accepted as evidence of proof. Situations may often be similar in certain aspects, but not in others. A counter-analogy weakens the original analogy by citing other comparisons that can be made on the same basis. BIASES 2-38. A subjective viewpoint, bias indicates a preconceived notion about someone or something. Biases generally have a detrimental impact on intelligence analysis because they obscure the true nature of the information. Intelligence analysts must be able to recognize cultural, organizational, personal, and cognitive biases and be aware of the potential influence they can have on judgment. Cultural Bias 2-39. Americans see the world in a certain way. The inability to see things through the eyes of someone from another country or culture is cultural bias. Biases interfere with the analyst’s ability to think the way an enemy commander might think or to give policymakers informed advice on the likely reaction of foreign governments to American policy. Also known as mirror imaging, cultural bias attributes someone else’s intentions, actions, or reactions to the same kind of logic, cultural values, and thought processes as the individual analyzing the situation. Although cultural bias is difficult to avoid, the following measures can lessen its impact:  Locate individuals who understand the culture:  Include them in the analytical process.  Ask their opinion about likely responses to friendly actions.  Take care when using their opinions since they may be subject to biases regarding ethnic groups or cultures in the region and their knowledge may be dated or inaccurate.  Locate regional experts, such as foreign and regional area officers, who have lived or traveled through the area and are somewhat conversant regarding the culture. Assess the quality of the information provided against the level of knowledge and experience the individual has for that culture or region. Organizational Bias 2-40. Most organizations have specific policy goals or preconceived ideas. Analyses conducted within these organizations may not be as objective as the same type of analysis done outside the organization. Groupthink and best case are organizational biases that can significantly skew internal analysis.  Groupthink. This bias occurs when a judgment is unconsciously altered because of exposure to selective information and common viewpoints held among individuals. Involving people outside the organization in the analysis can help identify and correct this bias.  Best Case. This bias occurs when an analyst presents good news or bad news in the most optimistic light. The judgment is deliberately altered to provide only the information the commander wants to hear. Analysts can avoid this bias by having the moral courage to tell the commander the whole story, good and bad.