s2underground_search · Manuals
Military manual ATP 2-33.4 Page 49 of 146 text: ocr+pdf

ATP 2-33.4, page 49

Intelligence Analysis

Army Techniques Publication: Intelligence Analysis

2014 public edition (Archive.org)

Page 49 of ATP 2-33.4
Searchable page text (OCR / PDF)
Diagnostic Analytic Techniques 4-26. Analysts should consciously avoid relating the source to the information until the quality of information check is complete. If relating the source to the quality of the information changes the opinion of the information, the analysts must ensure they can articulate why. Analysts should develop and employ a spreadsheet to track the information and record their confidence in the quality of information as a constant reminder of the findings. INDICATORS 4-27. Identifying and monitoring indicators are fundamental tasks of intelligence analysis, as they are the principal means of avoiding surprise. Indicators are often described as forward looking of predictive indicators. Facts 4-28. Indicators are the basis for situation development. An indicator, in intelligence usage, is an item of information which reflects the intention or capability of an adversary to adopt or reject a course of action (JP 2-0). An indicator is positive or negative evidence of threat activity or any characteristic of the AO that points toward threat vulnerabilities, the adoption or rejection by the threat of a particular activity, or that may influence the commander’s selection of a COA. Indicators may result from previous actions or from threat failure to take action. The all-source intelligence analyst integrates information from all sources to confirm indications of threat activities. Detection and confirmation of indicators enable analysts to answer priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). 4-29. If an indicator is a ploy (part of a deception plan), then conclusions based on it may be incorrect. Although indicators are clues that point toward threat activities, capabilities, vulnerabilities, or intentions, they may be deceptive and lead analysts to develop an incorrect intelligence estimate. Remember, an estimate is not certain, but is an opinion based on facts and the analysis of a particular situation. 4-30. Analysts should avoid acting on a single indicator. Integration of multiple indicators and other factors is essential before analysts can detect patterns and threat intentions. Other staff elements assist intelligence analysts in developing indicators, which is instrumental in answering commander’s PIRs and information requirements. Indicators serve as a means of prediction across all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical. (See levels of war in ADRP 3-0.) 4-31. A threat may attempt to create false or misleading patterns of intentions by providing friendly forces with false indicators. Analysts detect these false indicators, and then analyze them to determine what actual COA the threat is attempting to initiate. Analysts discover deception by comparing indicators, intelligence, and combat information from all sources to create an accurate picture of the AO. Because the use of indicators is such an important part of determining threat COAs, it is imperative that analysts carefully weigh all indicators. 4-32. Analysts should avoid making an assessment based on a single indicator. Integrating multiple indicators, reviewing high-value targets and the most likely enemy COA, and considering the enemy center of gravity will lead analysts to true threat intentions and capabilities. 4-33. Analysts— e@ Connect a series of occurrences or alarms to point to a higher indicator. e@ Use indicators to evaluate particular events or activities with probable threat COAs. @ Use indicators to determine what events or activities will likely occur for a threat force to follow a particular COA. 4-34. Analysts use the following steps to determine the mission-dependent indicators: © Develop indicators. © Weigh indicators. @ Analyze indicators. @ Use indicators. 18 August 2014 ATP 2-33.4 4-5 Diagnostic Analytic Techniques 18 August 2014 ATP 2-33.4 4-5 4-26. Analysts should consciously avoid relating the source to the information until the quality of information check is complete. If relating the source to the quality of the information changes the opinion of the information, the analysts must ensure they can articulate why. Analysts should develop and employ a spreadsheet to track the information and record their confidence in the quality of information as a constant reminder of the findings. INDICATORS 4-27. Identifying and monitoring indicators are fundamental tasks of intelligence analysis, as they are the principal means of avoiding surprise. Indicators are often described as forward looking of predictive indicators. FACTS 4-28. Indicators are the basis for situation development. An indicator, in intelligence usage, is an item of information which reflects the intention or capability of an adversary to adopt or reject a course of action (JP 2-0). An indicator is positive or negative evidence of threat activity or any characteristic of the AO that points toward threat vulnerabilities, the adoption or rejection by the threat of a particular activity, or that may influence the commander’s selection of a COA. Indicators may result from previous actions or from threat failure to take action. The all-source intelligence analyst integrates information from all sources to confirm indications of threat activities. Detection and confirmation of indicators enable analysts to answer priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). 4-29. If an indicator is a ploy (part of a deception plan), then conclusions based on it may be incorrect. Although indicators are clues that point toward threat activities, capabilities, vulnerabilities, or intentions, they may be deceptive and lead analysts to develop an incorrect intelligence estimate. Remember, an estimate is not certain, but is an opinion based on facts and the analysis of a particular situation. 4-30. Analysts should avoid acting on a single indicator. Integration of multiple indicators and other factors is essential before analysts can detect patterns and threat intentions. Other staff elements assist intelligence analysts in developing indicators, which is instrumental in answering commander’s PIRs and information requirements. Indicators serve as a means of prediction across all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical. (See levels of war in ADRP 3-0.) 4-31. A threat may attempt to create false or misleading patterns of intentions by providing friendly forces with false indicators. Analysts detect these false indicators, and then analyze them to determine what actual COA the threat is attempting to initiate. Analysts discover deception by comparing indicators, intelligence, and combat information from all sources to create an accurate picture of the AO. Because the use of indicators is such an important part of determining threat COAs, it is imperative that analysts carefully weigh all indicators. 4-32. Analysts should avoid making an assessment based on a single indicator. Integrating multiple indicators, reviewing high-value targets and the most likely enemy COA, and considering the enemy center of gravity will lead analysts to true threat intentions and capabilities. 4-33. Analysts—  Connect a series of occurrences or alarms to point to a higher indicator.  Use indicators to evaluate particular events or activities with probable threat COAs.  Use indicators to determine what events or activities will likely occur for a threat force to follow a particular COA. 4-34. Analysts use the following steps to determine the mission-dependent indicators:  Develop indicators.  Weigh indicators.  Analyze indicators.  Use indicators.