MCRP 12-10B.1, page 23

initial intelligence. The battles of Arnhem and Suez City probably would never have occurred had the attacker known the strength and locations of the defender’s forces. At Stalingrad, the attacking Germans were aware of the defending forces facing them in the Sixth Army’s zone, but the buildup of Soviet forces in other areas of the front was not anticipated and resulted in tactical surprise at those points, diluting the German offensive push to seize the city. Surprise is a combat multiplier and can substantially reduce the cost of urban warfare. b. Surprise. Surprise is a combat multiplier and can substantially reduce the cost of urban warfare. It can be achieved through deception, stealth, and ambiguity (MCDP 1-3, Tactics). Surprise was achieved by the attacker at Aachen and Ban Me Thuot and by the defender at Suez City. Surprise can be an important asset to increase leverage, but, as the failure at Arnhem shows, not necessarily a decisive one. When surprise is employed as a means to overcome other disadvantages, it is important to maintain accurate intelligence. In urban areas, tactical surprise by the attacker can be used to preempt effective defensive preparation of a city. c. Combined Arms. The MAGTF must capitalize on one of the key means for gaining advantage in maneuver warfare — the use of combined arms (MCDP 1-3, Tactics). The use of combined arms places the enemy in a dilemma. Any action the enemy takes to avoid one combat arm makes him/her more vulnerable to another. An analysis of categories of weapons systems found in a MAGTF helps to illustrate it is a warfighting organization well suited for MOUT: Combat in urban areas is primarily a small unit, infantry intensive operation (1) Infantry. Combat in urban areas is primarily a small-unit, infantry intensive operation. Restrictions on maneuver, particularly for mechanized units, increases oportunities for infiltration. Urban combat requires small-unit leadership, initiative, and skill. Decentralized actions and difficulties in command , control, and communications are typically encountered. Built-up areas, like close terrain found in other operational environments, are generally considered to be most suited for operations conducted by infantry. Infantry units can be organized, trained and equipped to negotiate urbanized terrain that restricts observation, fields of fire, and mechanized movement. (2) Armor. The role of armor in urban warfare can be significant. Of the 22 battles studied, armor participated in 21. In three-fourths of these battles, organic tank support was a central element when special assault teams were employed. Overall, special assault units supported by tanks were more successful than any other task organization. The use of tanks to the attacker inside a city has been effective only when they were protected by infantry. Tanks in support of infantry act as an “assault gun” that delivers concentrated, sustained fires to reduce held strongpoints. Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain 1-13