MCRP 12-10B.1, page 56
Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)
Marine Corps Reference Publication: Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)
Public distribution statement A; S2 KOCOA cited as MCRP 12-10 b.1
Searchable page text (OCR / PDF)
Section II
Infantry Battalion Operations
2201. Overview. This section addresses some of the operations that a task-organized and/or
reinforced infantry battalion could conduct in MOUT. These operations are seldom conducted
independently and are usually part of a larger joint operation. In the example given below, the
battalion has seized a foothold and is operating in its sector of a town of 100,000 people.
Concurrent operations are on-going through other parts of the town. The threat in the battalion
sector is a company (-) with a capability to reinforce.
2202. Seizure of a Key Objective. The tactical situation may require the immediate seizure of
a building, industrial complex, or transportation site that is deemed decisive terrain. Examples of
such objectives may include key bridges, intersections, railheads, or facilities that constitue the
center of gravity for the enemy. As an example, a battalion may be assigned the mission of seizing
the only bridge that is capable of supporting armored vehicles and resupply by heavy transports
along a river bisecting a town. The intent is to isolate enemy forces and secure the bridge for
follow-on forces. Intelligence indicates that the bridge is lightly defended at this time. In this case,
speed of attack and surprise is critical to capture the objective. Some key intelligence information
is required prior to the attack. This would include the number of enemy defending the bridge,
their weapons, disposition, their ability to reinforce their defense, location of LZs near the bridge,
whether the bridge has been set for demolition, and the location of enemy indirect fire assets that
can range the objective.
The commander decides to conduct a penetration using a combination of helicopterborne attack
to rapidly seize the bridge followed by a mechanized ground attack to link-up with the
helicopterborne forces (Figure 2-10). The helicopterborne force can achieve surprise and speed of
movement required while the mechanized force can thrust quickly along high-speed avenues to
minimize the time the helicopterborne force must hold the objective against enemy counterattack.
For the ground attack, the battalion commander makes a determination that speed of movement
outweighs the risks of rapidly extending his/her lines of communication. He/She directs, on the
basis of his/her knowledge of the enemy situation and his/her mission, that his/her maneuver
forces avoid decisive engagement with the enemy along the route to minimize the time it
takes to link up with the helicopterborne force. The commander provides guidance on those
enemy forces that should be bypassed and those that should be isolated and reduced.
The commander task organizes his/her battalion for rapid movement on two axes to allow
flexibility in reacting to unexpected enemy contact. Lead and rear security is conducted
throughout the operation. As lead units locate enemy positions, they fix them by fire, and
quickly reduce or bypass them. They also report the contact so that follow-on forces can then
deal with the threat.
As the ground attack force reaches the edge of the built-up area, Marines remain mounted so as
not to slow the advance. All vehicle machine guns fire to flanks and into doors, windows, and
MCWP 3-35
.3
2-24