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Military manual ADP 3-90 Page 12 of 108 text: pdf

ADP 3-90, page 12

Offense and Defense

Army Doctrine Publication: Offense and Defense

July 2019 public edition (supersedes Aug 2018); key terrain cited in S2 KOCOA

Page 12 of ADP 3-90
Searchable page text (OCR / PDF)
Chapter 1 1-2 ADP 3-90 31 July 2019 1-7. The levels of warfare help commanders to visualize a logical nesting of operations, to allocate resources, and to assign tasks to the appropriate echelon of command. Advances in technology and a complex information environment compress time and space relationships. This reality blurs the boundaries among the levels of warfare. In a world of constant and immediate communication, a single event may affect all three levels of warfare simultaneously. THE ART AND SCIENCE OF TACTICS 1-8. Army leaders at all echelons master the art and science of tactics—two distinct yet inseparable concepts—to solve the problems they will face on the battlefield. A tactical problem occurs when the mission variables—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (known as METT-TC)—of the desired tactical situation differ from the current situation. (See ADP 6-0 for a discussion of the mission variables.) THE ART OF TACTICS 1-9. The art of tactics is three interrelated aspects: the creative and flexible array of means to accomplish missions, decision making under conditions of uncertainty when faced with a thinking and adaptive enemy, and the understanding of the effects of combat on Soldiers. An art, as opposed to a science, requires exercising intuition based on operational experiences and cannot be learned solely by study. Leaders exercise the art of tactics by balancing study with a variety of relevant and practical experiences. Repetitive practice under a variety of realistic conditions increases an individual’s mastery of the art of tactics. 1-10. Leaders apply the art of tactics to solve tactical problems within their commander’s intent by choosing from interrelated options, including—  The types of operations, forms of maneuver, and tactical mission tasks.  Task organization of available forces and allocation of resources.  The arrangement and choice of control measures.  Controlling the tempo of the operation.  The level of necessary risk. 1-11. Combat is a lethal clash of opposing wills and a violent struggle between thinking and adaptive commanders with opposing goals. Commanders strive to defeat their enemies. Defeat is to render a force incapable of achieving its objectives (ADP 3-0). Commanders seek to accomplish missions that support operational or strategic purposes while preventing their enemies from doing the same. 1-12. These options that support operational or strategic purposes represent a starting point for developing a course of action (COA) to a specific tactical problem. Each decision represents a choice among a range of options. Each option balances competing demands and requires judgment. Tacticians use experience and creativity to outthink their opposing enemy commanders. The mission variables have many combinations that make each new tactical situation unique. Because enemy forces change and adapt to friendly moves during operations, there is no guarantee that the current plan remains valid throughout a single operation. Creative and Flexible Application of Means 1-13. The first aspect of the art of tactics is the innovative application of the means available to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative against enemy forces. These means include friendly capabilities, organizations, and materiel. Effective employment of available means requires an understanding of how friendly forces fight the offense and defense. Effective employment also requires understanding the enemy’s objectives and methods it uses to organize and operate its forces. 1-14. Military forces that seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and employ movement and maneuver operate in more than just the land domain. Tactical through strategic land operations depend on the ability of Army forces to affect the behavior and capabilities of enemies, adversaries, and the local population in their area of operations (AO). The ability to influence relevant actors requires an understanding of the information environment and the ways that information affects them and military operations. Affecting their behavior and