ADP 3-90, page 79
Offense and Defense
Army Doctrine Publication: Offense and Defense
July 2019 public edition (supersedes Aug 2018); key terrain cited in S2 KOCOA
Searchable page text (OCR / PDF)
The Defense
31 July 2019
ADP 3-90
4-19
4-117. Commanders deliberately plan for the transition process and allow the setting of the conditions
necessary for a successful transition. Such planning addresses the need to control the tempo of operations,
maintain contact with both enemy and friendly forces, and keep enemy forces off balance. It establishes the
procedures and priorities by which a unit prepares for its next mission. It establishes the required organization
of forces and control measures necessary for success in accordance with the mission variables.
4-118. Prior planning decreases the time needed to adjust the tempo of combat operations when a unit
transitions from defensive operations to offensive operations. This planning allowing subordinate units to
conduct parallel planning and prepare for subsequent operations. Preparations include resupplying unit basic
loads and repositioning or reallocating supporting systems.
4-119. Planning also reduces the amount of time and confusion that arises when a unit is unsuccessful in its
defensive efforts and must transition to retrograde operations. Commanders designate units to conduct denial
operations and to evacuate casualties and equipment. Commanders use retrograde operations to preserve their
forces as combat-capable formations until they can establish those conditions necessary for a successful
defense. Plans should account for both failure and success, and they should account for a transition to
offensive or stability operations.
TRANSITION TO THE OFFENSE
4-120. A defending commander seeks a window of opportunity to transition to offensive operations by
anticipating when and where an enemy force will reach its culminating point or require an operational pause
before it can continue. During these windows, the combat power ratios mostly favor a defending force. An
enemy force will do everything it can to keep a friendly force from knowing when it is overextended. The
following items indicate that an enemy force is becoming overextended:
Enemy forces begin to transition to the defense—this defense may be by forces in or out of contact
with friendly forces.
Enemy forces suffer heavy losses.
Enemy forces start to deploy before encountering friendly forces.
Enemy forces are defeated in most engagements.
Enemy forces are committed piecemeal in continued attacks.
Enemy aviation forces are used in place of ineffective ground forces.
Enemy reserve forces are identified among attacking forces.
Examination of captured or killed enemy soldiers and captured or destroyed enemy equipment and
supplies shows that the enemy forces cannot adequately sustain themselves.
Enemy forces have a noticeable reduction in their tempo of operations.
Local counterattacks meet with unexpected success.
4-121. In a mobile defense, transitioning to an offense generally follows a striking force’s attack. In an area
defense, commanders designate a portion of their force to conduct the counterattack, selecting units based on
the commander’s concept of operations. However, commanders allocate available reserves to this
counterattack effort.
4-122. Commanders reorganize and resupply to support the offense. These actions require a transition in
the sustainment effort, with a shift in emphasis from ensuring a capability to defend from a chosen location
to an emphasis on ensuring a force’s ability to advance and maneuver. For example, in a defense the
sustainment effort may have focused on the forward stockage of Class IV and V items and the rapid
evacuation of damaged systems. In an offense, the sustainment effort may need to focus on providing
petroleum, oils, and lubricants; forward repair and maintenance; and replacement of combat losses. A
transition is often a time in which units can perform deferred equipment maintenance. Additional assets may
also be available on a temporary basis for casualty evacuation and medical treatment because of a reduction
in the tempo of operations.
4-123. Commanders should not wait too long to transition from defensive operations to offensive operations
as an enemy force approaches its culminating point. Enemy forces will be dispersed, extended in depth, and
weakened. At that time, any enemy defensive preparations will be hasty, and enemy forces will not be
adequately prepared for defense. Commanders want enemy forces weakened when transitioning to the