AFDD 2-1.9, page 49

39 to achieve desired effects while avoiding unacceptable collateral damage. All approved targets are weaponeered to include at least the following: › Target identification and description. › Recommended aim points/DPIs. › Desired level(s) of damage, degradation, or exploitation. › Weapon system and munitions recommendations. › Fuzing requirements (if required). › Probability of achieving desired direct effect(s). › Target area terrain, weather, and threat considerations. › Collateral damage considerations. › WMD agent dispersal / collateral effects. Precautions must be taken to avoid or minimize civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. The danger of collateral damage varies with the type of target, terrain, weapons used, weather, and the proximity of civilians and their structures. According to LOAC, incidental damage to civilian objects must not be excessive in relation to the expected military advantage to be gained. If an attack is directed against dual-use objects that might be legitimate military targets but also serve a legitimate civilian need (e.g., electrical power or telecommunications), then this factor must be carefully balanced against the military benefits when making a weapons selection, as must reconstruction and stabilization considerations following the end of hostilities. Thus, those conducting weaponeering must always keep campaign objectives and the end state in mind, as must those in other CAOC teams and divisions who review weaponeering solutions and the MAAP. The methodologies and data used for weaponeering analyses are also capable of producing estimations of collateral damage risk to noncombatants and non-targeted facilities. Established ROE and LOAC also address collateral damage concerns. (See Appendix A for further information.) Targeteers must comply with Joint Chiefs of Staff CD estimation methodology. For example, it may sometimes be necessary to strike a target more precisely than would otherwise be necessary in order to avoid collateral civilian damage. Certain levels of collateral damage estimation require expertise that lies outside of the CFACC's—or even CFC's—control and must be coordinated through the ISRD via federated and reachback relationships. In another sense, the very precision of certain weaponeering solutions, especially against some hardened and/or buried targets, may cause ripple effects through other CAOC divisions or joint agencies because intended effects may not be readily visible. This happened during DESERT STORM, when Iraqi hardened aircraft shelters were repeatedly struck because the results of earlier fully effective attacks were not immediately apparent.