AFDD 2-1.9, page 86

76 with those in combat operations is essential for seamless targeting support when the ATO requires modification. This importance is magnified when supporting dynamic targeting operations, especially those involving TSTs. › Dynamic Targeting Team. The targeting team in the COD works for the dynamic targeting team chief, but closely coordinates with the SIDO’s personnel. This team consists of, at a minimum, a target intelligence duty officer and a target duty technician. › Operational Assessment Team. The OAT in the SD is responsible for determining whether or not desired effects are being created and if those effects are leading to the attainment of CFACC and CFC objectives. The targeting database must match up with that used by the OAT so that specific targets can be tracked to specific effects and objectives. › Strategy Plans Team. The strategy plans team in the SD is responsible for building the overall CFACC strategy and is responsible for producing the JAOP. This phase of planning may involve a need to access targeting databases in order to support JAOP creation. › Information Operations Team. The IOT is responsible for identifying opportunities to achieve desired effects primarily through non-kinetic means. Based upon its full integration throughout the CAOC planning cycle, the IOT is also often able to recommend different options or parallel courses of action to maximize success in achieving a specific effect. The main targeting database resides in automated command and control tools (currently TBMCS). Problems with TBMCS have led targeteers in some theaters to …the critical linchpin for both the error in identification of the building and the failure of the review mechanisms is the inadequacy of the supporting data bases and the mistaken assumption the information they contained would be necessarily accurate. The misidentification of the targeted building as the [correct target] would not have occurred had the data bases had the correct location of the Chinese Embassy. All the data bases that contained information on the Chinese Embassy placed it at its original, pre-1996 location some four miles away. Thus, the question of possible damage to the Embassy was never a consideration. —George Tenet, Former Director of Central Intelligence Remarks to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence concerning the inadvertent Chinese Embassy bombing, Operation ALLIED FORCE, 22 July