ATP 2-33.4, page 51

Diagnostic Analytic Techniques 18 August 2014 ATP 2-33.4 4-7 4-40. When confronted with doubtful or conflicting indicators, analysts weigh some indicators more heavily than others to determine the threat’s actual intent. This is not easily accomplished; it takes time and experience to become proficient in associating indicators with COAs. 4-41. The assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2) staff develops a list of indicators and places a priority on each. This prioritization establishes the relative weight of one indicator compared to another. Despite the weight, or value placed on the indicators, it is dangerous to draw conclusions from a single indicator. The analyst integrates each indicator with other indicators and factors and then defines patterns and establishes threat intentions. The analyst may develop standing or specific indicators to answer the commander’s PIRs and information requirements. The information collected and intelligence provided through the indications and warning effort drive operational-level planning and long-term PIRs and information requirements. The analyst uses these indicators to cross-reference specific events and activities with probable threat trends and COAs. 4-42. The most obvious indicators are not necessarily the best depiction of a particular enemy COA. The obvious indicators may actually serve as elements of a deception plan. The successful analysis of indicators can assist in confirming or denying enemy COAs, and is therefore essential in supporting the commander. However, it is important not to search for indicators of an expected COA or to expect a certain COA at all. Leaders use indicators as a tip-off that something is occurring but demand that intelligence analysts dig deeper into the why or what of the situation and develop an indicator list specific to the situation. 4-43. In combat, the analyst is usually confronted with conflicting indicators. An enemy force will go to great efforts to deceive us by portraying indications which point to the adoption of a COA that the enemy does not intend to adopt. Enemy forces may use patterns associated with attack, defense, and delay simultaneously. These conflicting patterns may result from intentional deception, imprecise execution, temporary indecision, random activity, or incomplete or inaccurate information. 4-44. The analyst requires a thorough knowledge of the threat and of the characteristics of the operational environment that can affect military operations. Detailed knowledge of enemy organization, equipment, tactical doctrine, and logistical methods is valuable. Also valuable is the probable enemy knowledge of the area under friendly control and the personalities of the enemy commanders and the past performance of the opposing enemy units. The analyst must develop a way to identify those indicators that are most indicative of a COA. There are several techniques which may be used individually or in combination. 4-45. One technique of determining the enemy's intent is to consider the origin or source of the indicator, or why the enemy presents a certain pattern. Indicators stem from military logic, doctrinal training, organizational constraints, bureaucratic constraints, or the personality of the enemy commander. 4-46. The event matrix and information collection plan serve as important tools for analysts to document developing events. By developing these products in a logical, progressive, or step-by-step manner, they often provide easy answers for the G-2/S-2 during the initial phases of an event; however, there may be a tendency to over rely on them. Indicators also tend to discourage analytical thinking because a broad view of the event is more readily apparent. 4-47. While it is important to understand and look for indicators of military activity, analysts cannot ignore specific indicators that might not fit a military category. All-source intelligence analysts at the operational and strategic levels consider the availability of resources such as funding, fuel, and the ability of a country to sustain its military. Fiscal Resources 4-48. A fiscal resource is one of the very best indicators of an organization’s or country’s ability to support a limited or protracted military mission or its willingness to militarily, overtly, or covertly support another country’s military or terrorist action. Fiscal resources underline the main indicators of a terrorist group’s COAs, intentions, and capabilities. 4-49. Countries that are not fiscally independent may be willing to allow the use of their territory as a training or holding area and use their military in a mercenary role in return for monies, equipment, or advanced technology. When a country undertakes an action or program requiring a significant commitment of fiscal resources, it is a strong indication of a serious intent, capability, and commitment to that action or