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Military manual JP 3-0 Page 139 of 204 text: pdf

JP 3-0, page 139

Joint Operations

Joint Publication: Joint Operations

11 August 2011 public edition

Page 139 of JP 3-0
Searchable page text (OCR / PDF)
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations V-33 THE GULF WAR, 1990-1991 On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. Much of the rest of the world, including most other Arab nations, united in condemnation of that action. On 7 August, the operation known as DESERT SHIELD began. Its principal objectives were to deter further aggression and to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The United Nations (UN) Security Council passed a series of resolutions calling for Iraq to leave Kuwait, finally authorizing “all necessary means,” including the use of force, to force Iraq to comply with UN resolutions. The United States led in establishing a political and military coalition to force Iraq from Kuwait and restore stability to the region. The military campaign to accomplish these ends took the form, in retrospect, of a series of major operations. These operations employed the entire capability of the international military coalition and included operations in war and operations other than war throughout. The campaign—which included Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and the subsequent period of postconflict operations—can be viewed in the following major phases. • DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP (to include crisis action planning, mobilization, deployment, and deterrence) • DEFENSE (with deployment and force buildup continuing) • OFFENSE • POSTWAR OPERATIONS (to include redeployment) DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP. While diplomats attempted to resolve the crisis without combat, the coalition’s military forces conducted rapid planning, mobilization, and the largest strategic deployment since World War II. One of the earliest military actions was a maritime interdiction of the shipping of items of military potential to Iraq. The initial entry of air and land forces into the theater was unopposed. The Commander, United States Central Command (CDRUSCENTCOM), balanced the arrival of these forces to provide an early, viable deterrent capability and the logistic capability needed to receive, further deploy, and sustain the rapidly growing force. Planning, mobilization, and deployment continued throughout this phase. DEFENSE. While even the earliest arriving forces were in a defensive posture, a viable defense was possible only after the buildup of sufficient coalition air, land, and maritime combat capability. Mobilization and deployment of forces continued. Operations security (OPSEC) measures, operational military deception, and operational psychological operations were used to influence Iraqi dispositions, expectations, and combat effectiveness and thus degrade their abilities to resist CDRUSCENTCOM’s