JP 3-0, page 169
Joint Operations
Joint Publication: Joint Operations
11 August 2011 public edition
Searchable page text (OCR / PDF)
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations
V-63
i. Legitimacy. Military activities during the stabilize phase should sustain the
legitimacy of the operation and of the emerging or host government. During operations
where a government does not exist, extreme caution should be used when dealing with
individuals and organizations to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them. Implementation
of SC-related guidance through the commander’s communications strategy can enhance
perceptions of the legitimacy of stability operations.
j. OPSEC. Although there may be no clearly defined threat, the essential elements
of US military operations should be safeguarded. The uncertain nature of the situation,
coupled with the potential for rapid change, require that OPSEC be an integral part of
stability operations. OPSEC planners must consider the effect of media coverage and the
possibility coverage may compromise essential security or disclose critical information.
17. Considerations for Enabling Civil Authority
a. General. In this phase, the joint operation normally is terminated when the stated
military strategic and/or operational objectives have been met and redeployment of the
joint force is accomplished. This should mean that a legitimate civil authority has been
enabled to manage the situation without further outside military assistance. In some
cases, it may become apparent that the stated objectives fall short of properly enabling
civil authority. This situation may require a redesign of the joint operation as a result of
an extension of the required stability operations in support of US diplomatic, HN, IGO,
and/or NGO efforts.
b. Peace Building. The transition from military operations to full civilian control
may involve ongoing operations that have a significant combat component, including
counterinsurgency operations, antiterrorism, and CT. Even while combat operations are
ongoing, the operation will include a large stability component that is essentially a PB
mission. PB, transitioning to a DOS led effort, provides the reconstruction and societal
rehabilitation that offers hope to the HN populace. Stability measures establish the
conditions that enable PB to succeed. PB promotes reconciliation, strengthens and
rebuilds civil infrastructures and institutions, builds confidence, and supports economic
reconstruction to prevent a return to conflict. The ultimate measure of success in PB is
political, not military. Therefore, JFCs seek a clear understanding of the
national/coalition strategic end state and how military operations support that end state.
c. Transfer to Civil Authority. In many cases, the United States will transfer
responsibility for the political and military affairs of the HN to another authority. JFCs
may be required to transfer responsibility of operations to another authority (e.g., UN
observers, multinational peacekeeping force, or NATO) as the termination criteria. This
probably will occur after an extended period of conducting joint or multinational stability
operations and PB missions as described above. Overall, transfer likely will occur in
stages (e.g., HN sovereignty, PO under UN mandate, termination of all US military
participation). Joint force support to this effort may include the following: