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Chapter III III-26 JP 3-0 or dismantle these illicit financial networks. Monitoring, assessing, analyzing, and exploiting financial information are key support functions for CTF activities. For more guidance on joint interdiction operations, refer to JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction. (5) Strategic Attack. A strategic attack is a JFC-directed offensive action against a target—whether military, diplomatic, economic, or other—that is specifically selected to achieve national or military strategic objectives. The JFC should consider conducting strategic attacks, when feasible. These attacks seek to weaken the adversary’s ability or will to engage in conflict or continue an action and as such, could be part of a campaign, major operation, or conducted independently as directed by the President or SecDef. Additionally, these attacks may achieve strategic objectives without necessarily having to achieve operational objectives as a precondition. Suitable targets may include but are not limited to enemy strategic COGs. All components of a joint force may have capabilities to conduct strategic attacks. (6) IO Capabilities in Support of Fires (a) CNA disrupts, denies, degrades, or destroys information resident in computers and computer networks (relying on the data stream to execute the attack), or the computers and networks themselves. (b) EA involves the use of electromagnetic (EM) energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying adversary combat capability. The effects of EA can be lethal or nonlethal. EA can be used against a computer when the attack occurs through the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), while CNA attacks using the data stream through the AIR INTERDICTION DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, most of the effort against Iraqi ground troops was focused on Republican Guard divisions and on a handful of stalwart regular divisions that formed part of the defensive ring south of Baghdad. One prominent air interdiction success story involved the Iraqi Republican Guard’s redeployment of elements of the Hammurabi, Nebuchadnezzar, and Al Nida divisions after 25 March 2003 to the south of Baghdad toward Karbala, Hillah, and Al Cut. Their road movements were steadily bombed by US Air Force A-10s and B-52s (dropping 500-pound bombs) and British Tornados. An Iraqi commander concluded that their movement south had been one of the Iraqi regime’s major errors because it exposed the Republican Guard to coalition air power and resulted in large casualty figures. SOURCE: Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo #30 Carl Conetta, 26 September 2003