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Appendix C C-8 JP 3-60 assessments, and provide inputs to the RTL and NSL. IO planners will coordinate and integrate IO at all levels. Most destructive IO attacks will either support or be considered strategic attacks or interdiction operations. Therefore, planners, operators, and targeteers should carefully consider prospective IO target nominations when making apportionment decisions. For further information, see JP 3-13, Information Operations. 9. Joint Targeting Process within Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning Deliberate and crisis action planning are the mechanisms with which a JFC translates national military objectives into a viable COA that is supported by detailed planning. This is the context within which the joint targeting process occurs. Despite the outward differences, deliberate and crisis action planning are essentially the same processes completed under different circumstances. Joint targeting remains the same within these processes, with shifting emphasis based upon the situation. For further information, see JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning. 10. Monitoring and Coordinating Target Execution a. Target Awareness. The operation center director, located at JIOC, JOC, and/or component command centers, monitors the execution of current operations and maintains SA of planned, executed, and emerging (especially time-sensitive) targets. (1) Starting with the current OPORD and the JIPTL (or other prioritized target list), the operation center director must have knowledge of each target, its importance, when it is scheduled for engagement, the responsible component, the asset, and the desired outcome. The operation center director should also have knowledge of target vulnerability and susceptibility to various joint force capabilities. (2) The knowledge required above enables the operation center director to better understand the significance of a report indicating that an engagement on a particular target has been unsuccessful or of a report of a newly located priority target. In the latter situation, the operation center director should recommend to the commander whether the new target would require actions at the expense of another one already scheduled for engagement. This advice should also analyze the impact on friendly operations (including consequences for taking no action versus the impact on ongoing and planned joint force actions). Decisions to modify missions or direct attacks that deviate from the OPORD should be based on the commander’s guidance, the theater strategy, and the campaign objectives to be accomplished. These decisions normally can only be made with an understanding of priorities of each component’s targeting efforts throughout the operation. b. Emerging Targets. The operation center director should know what forces are available for tasking, as well as their capabilities to engage an emerging target (e.g., on-call target, target of opportunity, or TST). They should also understand joint fires and how joint fire support and joint operations are integrated. As shortfalls develop, component commanders normally prioritize the weight of effort, reconsider the adequacy of the