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Military manual JP 3-60 Page 62 of 138 text: pdf

JP 3-60, page 62

Joint Targeting

Joint Publication: Joint Targeting

31 January 2013 public edition

Page 62 of JP 3-60
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Chapter II II-32 JP 3-60 (1) Establishing planned FSCMs against specific TSTs. (2) Defining TST engagement authority based on a JFC’s OA, assigned functional mission, or a combination thereof. The JFC should normally define those situations, if any, where immediate destruction of the imminent TST threat outweighs the potential for duplication of effort. The JFC should carefully balance the risk between the TST threat and the potential for friendly fire and collateral damage. (3) Identifying specific communication requirements between component C2 elements of the joint force to conduct rapid TST engagement. This normally includes authorizing direct liaison and coordinating authority. (4) For those targets that component commanders consider the component equivalent of a TST, the applicable component commanders should coordinate relative priorities and establish guidance at the JTCB, through the joint fires element (JFE), or via other appropriate means. b. Risk Assessment Considerations for TSTs (1) A critical aspect of successful TST engagement is to understand the level of risk acceptable to the JFC. This is a complex task. Items to be considered in the risk assessment include risk to civilians, friendly forces, and noncombatants; possible collateral damage; and the disruption incurred by diverting assets from their deliberately planned missions. These base considerations must be balanced against the danger of not engaging the TST, risk of mission failure, or harm to friendly forces. (2) Successful prosecution of TSTs requires a well organized and well rehearsed process for sharing sensor data and targeting information, identifying suitable strike assets, obtaining mission approval, and rapidly deconflicting weapon employment. The key for success is performing as much coordination and decision making as possible in advance. (3) The on-scene commander’s knowledge of JFC guidance and intent can greatly accelerate decision making and reduce the reaction time between detection and engagement. This is critical when time compression precludes thoroughly coordinating all decisions and actions. For this to occur, the JFC must articulate objectives, guidance, priorities, and intent for TSTs before target identification. (4) The appropriate response for each TST is often dependent on the level of conflict, the clarity of the desired effect, and ROE. For example, during a major combat operation the JFC may be able to accept a higher level of risk to civilians, friendly forces, and noncombatants when attacking adversary WMD to ensure a quicker response. But during a limited contingency operation, the risk of collateral damage may require more detailed and time-consuming coordination. c. C2 for TST Operations (1) Focused Operations. The JFC has several options with which to structure C2 operations for engaging TSTs. Generally, TSTs are engaged using dynamic targeting, so the