MCRP 12-10B.1, page 28

high in the majority of urban battles. A high cost does not necessarily imply that the results were not worth the price. The attacker and defender must thoroughly evaluate the overall cost prior to committing to an urban battle. From the offensive point of view, several factors can be associated with cost. First, and most importantly, isolating the urban area is critical to the attacker’s success. Second, overwhelming superiority is needed if all costs are to be minimized. Third, the operation should be carefully planned. Fourth, intelligence is invaluable. Knowing where and how the city has been prepared for defense is also important. Fifth, attacking forces should understand the unique nature of urban combat. Clear tactics, techniques, and procedures for urban combat is required. Every aspect, from taking a building to using destructive technology and coordinating combined arms, must be thoroughly understood. Careful consideration of these five factors can minimize the cost of urban warfare to the attacker. Attacker cost was generally high in casualties, time, and resources in the majority of urban battles studied. From the standpoint of the defender, the critical variable is the defensive preparation of the city. Defensive preparations should include measures to prevent isolation of the city by the attackers. The capture of a prepared city can be made to be extremely costly. Preparations can include creating kill zones, clearing fields of fire, constructing canalizing obstacles, establishing reinforcing and fall-back positions, decentralizing command and control, and organizing multiple movement routes above ground, between rooftops, and below ground in subways and sewers. Artillery and aviation support can also be valuable force multipliers in defense. i. Rules of Engagement (ROE). The nature of the military operation may restrict our use of weapons. The majority of urban battles since 1967 (such as Beirut II, Hue, Jerusalem) have had one or more of the following restrictions imposed on the attacking force: (1) Minimizing civilian casualties and/or collateral destruction in order to: Avoiding alienation of the local population Reducing the risk of adverse world or domestic opinion Preserving facilities for future use Preserving cultural facilities and grounds. (2) Limiting the use of specific ground or air weapons. j. Logistics. Timely combat service support, particularly in the areas of ammunition resupply and casualty treatment and evacuation, is a critical element in MOUT. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-35.3 1-18