MCRP 12-10B.1, page 27

e. Special Assault Teams. In these battle studies, “shock units” or “special assault teams” have been used by attackers (and often by defenders) with great success. These organizations were characterized by the integration of combined arms at the battalion level and below. Control was decentralized to lower echelons (down to the squad level in some cases). Assault teams typically contained infantry with various combinations of armor, artillery, and engineers. Hence, all combat arms should plan, train, and develop common tactics, techniques, and procedures for use on urbanized terrain. Before the battle of Aachen, U.S. ground forces conducted intensive urban training with antitank teams and artillery pieces down to the squad and fire team levels. In contrast, the defender, in most cases having to fight with whatever forces were locally available, had no opportunity to conduct combined-arms training. The use of combined arms warfare on urbanized terrain is imperative. f. Time. In most cases, successful conclusion of an urban battle took two to three times longer than the initial estimates. Consequently, the additional tome resulted in the expenditure of more logistics and the loss of more personnel then initially anticipated. This often had adverse affects on the overall campaign. Well-planned urban defense, even if the defender is isolated or lacking in aviation, armor, or artillery weapons, can be time consuming to the attacker. Time can allow the defender to reorganize, redeploy, or marshal resources in other areas. Generally, urban warfare is time consuming. Three battles where time played an unanticipated critical role in the attacker’s strategic timetable were Aachen, Khorramshahr, and Stalingrad. In these battles, the defenders delayed the attacker longer than was estimated, resulting in the modification of operational or strategic plans. g. Isolation. The attacker won all urban battles where the defender was totally isolated. Even the partial isolation of the defenders resulted in attackers enjoying a success rate of 80 percent. Conversely, attackers won only 50 percent of the battles in which defenders were not significantly isolated, and those victories came at great cost. No single factor is more important to the attacker’s success than isolation of the urban area. In most urban battles, some form of isolation occurred as a result of the attacker’s actions. While it is unrealistic to envision complete isolation of a city until enemy forces to the rear of the city are pushed far beyond its outermost boundaries, total isolation does not appear necessary. The key to the attacker’s success is in stemming the unimpeded flow of workforce, supplies, and weapons to replace the defender’s losses. h. Cost. The cost of conducting urban warfare is relative to the percentage of total expended resources, the time elapsed, and the results achieved. The cost to the attacker was considered Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain 1-17