AFDP 3-60, page 20

Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-60, Targeting 17 (OSINT) can be equally, and sometimes more, important to targeteers and planners.27 Collaboration with reachback and federated organizations may enable analysts to pull together this multitude of intelligence sources for targeting. The USAF controls only its own reachback capabilities to meet air component requirements, whereas the joint and national systems are based on the needs of CCDRs or JFCs. These higher-level needs are coordinated with the wider joint community through the joint staff (JS) J-2, and the air component commander should submit requirements through the CCDR or JFC for joint or national federated support. In all cases, targeting support should be coordinated prior to hostilities. Such coordination should delineate specific duties for partners, establish timelines, and determine communication methods. Additionally, air component commanders should coordinate federated partner participation alongside internal reachback capabilities in theater exercises. Without proper coordination, federated partners may be unclear of duties once hostilities begin. Exercise participation may reveal points of friction, process errors, and operational limitations that coordination alone may not reveal. Federated partners may also face conflicting priorities when multiple contingencies occur simultaneously across different theaters, as most are not subordinate to a single, specific theater. Solid peacetime working relationships and shared experiences of targeting functions through exercise participation may help reduce the impact of such seams or priority conflicts. Communications, information, and targeting systems of record should be established, tested, and coordinated to provide a seamless information flow of data between forward and rear locations. Denied, degraded, intermittent, or limited (DDIL) communication environments place additional stress on operations, and the development of resilient communication paths and robust primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans (PACE) can mitigate disruption to targeting information flow. Operations in a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) environment present significant challenges for communication of information among commanders, federated and reachback organizations, and fielded forces.28 27 For additional information on intelligence disciplines, see AFDP 2-0, Intelligence. 28 For additional information on CBRN, see AFDP 3-40, Countering WMD Operations.