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Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations V-19 information. The beliefs, perceptions, lifestyles, and economic underpinnings of the society, among other considerations, influence the operational environment and will affect planning and execution. (1) Security cooperation efforts likely will impact countries throughout a region. Traditional rivalries among neighboring states and hostility toward the United States may be factors. For example, US assistance to a nation with long-standing enemies in the area may be perceived by these enemies as upsetting the regional balance of power. These same nations or others may see US intervention in the area simply as US imperialism. While such factors will not dictate US policy, they will require careful evaluation and consideration when conducting military operations under those conditions. (2) The emergence of non-state regional actors and an increase in multinational efforts to enhance stability and foster development, have increased cultural and language challenges faced by joint forces and increased interpreter and translator requirements to support multinational operations. SECTION D. CRISIS RESPONSE AND LIMITED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 7. Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations a. A limited contingency operation in response to a crisis includes all of those operations for which a JFC must develop an OPLAN or OPORD. The level of complexity, duration, and resources depends on the circumstances. Included are operations to ensure the safety of American citizens and US interests while maintaining and improving US ability to operate with multinational partners to deter the hostile ambitions of potential aggressors (such as JTF SHINING HOPE in the spring of 1999 to support refugee humanitarian relief for hundreds of thousands of Albanians fleeing their homes in Kosovo). Many of these operations involve a combination of military forces and capabilities in close cooperation with interorganizational partners. b. Initial Response. When crises develop and the President directs, CCDRs respond. If the crisis revolves around external threats to a regional partner, CCDRs employ joint forces to deter aggression and signal US commitment (such as deploying joint forces to train in Kuwait). If the crisis is caused by an internal conflict that threatens regional stability, US forces may intervene to restore or guarantee stability (such as Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY, the 1994 intervention in Haiti). If the crisis is within US territory (e.g., natural or man-made disaster, deliberate attack), US joint forces will conduct CS and HD operations as directed by the President and SecDef. Prompt deployment of sufficient forces in the initial phase of a crisis can preclude the need to deploy larger forces later. Effective early intervention also can deny an adversary time to set conditions in their favor or achieve destabilizing objectives; or mitigate the effects of a natural or man-made disaster. Deploying a credible force rapidly is one step in deterring or blocking aggression. However, deployment alone will not guarantee success. Achieving successful deterrence involves convincing the adversary that the deployed