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Chapter V V-30 JP 3-0 always possible, particularly in situations where destabilizing conditions have existed for years or where conditions are such that a long-term commitment is required to achieve national strategic objectives. Nevertheless, it is imperative to have a clear national strategic end state for all types of contingencies. b. Intelligence Collection. As soon as practical, JFCs and their staffs determine intelligence requirements to support the anticipated operation. Intelligence planners also consider the capability for a unit to receive external intelligence support, the capability to store intelligence data, the timeliness of collection systems, the availability of intelligence publications, and the possibility of using other agencies and organizations as intelligence sources. In some contingencies (such as PKO), the term information collection is used rather than the term intelligence because of the operation’s sensitivity. (1) HUMINT often may provide the most useful source of information and is essential to determining foreign intent. If a HUMINT infrastructure is not in place when US forces arrive, it needs to be established as quickly as possible. HUMINT also complements other intelligence sources with information not available through technical means. For example, while overhead imagery may graphically depict the number of people gathered in a town square, it cannot gauge the motivations or enthusiasm of the crowd. Additionally, in underdeveloped areas, belligerent forces may not rely heavily on radio communication, thereby denying US forces intelligence derived through signal intercept. (2) Where there is little USG or US military presence, open-source intelligence (OSINT) may be the best immediately available information to prepare US forces to operate in a foreign country. OSINT from radio broadcasts, newspapers, and periodicals often provide tip-offs for HUMINT and other intelligence and information collection methods. (3) Intelligence collection requires a focus on adversary system factors that affect the situation. This requires a depth of expertise in, and a mental and psychological integration with, all aspects of the operational environment’s peoples and their cultures, politics, religion, economics, and related factors; and any variances within affected groups of people. In addition, intelligence collection must focus quickly on transportation infrastructure in the operational area, to include capabilities and limitations of major seaports, airfields, and surface LOCs. (4) Intelligence organizations (principally at the JTF HQ level) should include foreign area officers. They add valuable cultural awareness to the production of useable intelligence. c. Constraints and Restraints. A JFC tasked with conducting or supporting a crisis response or limited contingency operation may face numerous constraints and restraints. For example, international acceptance of each operation may be extremely important, not only because military forces may be used to support international sanctions, but also because of the probability of involvement by IGOs. As a consequence, legal and fiscal constraints unique to the operation should be addressed in