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Chapter V V-40 JP 3-0 (d) Determining the proper force mix (e.g., combat, military police, CA, engineer, medical, multinational). (e) Assessing availability of HN law enforcement and HSS resources. (f) Securing key infrastructure nodes and facilitating HN law enforcement and first responder services. (g) Developing and disseminating information necessary to suppress potential new enemies and promote new governmental authority. (3) CA units contain a variety of specialty skills that may support the joint operation being planned. CA units can assess the civil infrastructure, assist in the operation of temporary shelters, and serve as liaisons between the military and civil organizations. Establishing and maintaining military-to-civil relations may include interaction among US, allied or multinational, HN forces, as well as OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. CA forces can provide expertise on factors that directly affect military operations to include culture, social structure, economic systems, language, and HNS capabilities. CA may be able to perform functions for limited durations that normally are the responsibility of local or indigenous governments. Employment of CA forces should be based upon a clear concept of CA mission requirements for the type operation being planned. For further guidance on CA, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. (4) Sustainment. Thorough planning for logistic and personnel support is critical. For example, the infrastructure required to deploy and support combat operations must be identified, resourced, and emplaced in a timely manner. Planning must include active participation by all deploying and in-theater US and multinational forces. c. Isolating the Enemy (1) With Presidential and SecDef approval, guidance, and national support, JFCs strive to isolate enemies by denying them allies and sanctuary. The intent is to strip away as much enemy support or freedom of action as possible, while limiting the enemy’s potential for horizontal or vertical escalation. JFCs also may be tasked by the President and SecDef to support diplomatic, economic, and informational actions. (2) The JFC also seeks to isolate the main enemy force from both its strategic leadership and its supporting infrastructure. Such isolation can be achieved through the use of IO and the interdiction of LOCs or resources affecting the enemy’s ability to conduct or sustain military operations. This step serves to deny the enemy both physical and psychological support and may separate the enemy leadership and military from their public support. d. Flexible Deterrent Options. FDOs are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions carefully tailored to bring an issue to early resolution without armed conflict. Both