JP 3-0, page 147
Joint Operations
Joint Publication: Joint Operations
11 August 2011 public edition
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Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations
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military and nonmilitary FDOs can be used to dissuade actions before a crisis arises or to
deter further aggression during a crisis. FDOs are developed for each instrument of
national power, but they are most effective when used in combination.
(1) Military FDOs can be initiated before or after unambiguous warning.
Deployment timelines, combined with the requirement for a rapid, early response,
generally require economy of force; however, military FDOs should not increase risk to
the force that exceeds the potential benefit of the desired effect. Military FDOs must be
carefully tailored regarding timing, efficiency, and effectiveness. They can rapidly
improve the military balance of power in the operational area; especially in terms of early
warning, intelligence gathering, logistic infrastructure, air and maritime forces, MISO,
and protection without precipitating armed response from the adversary. Care should be
taken to avoid undesired effects such as eliciting an armed response should adversary
leadership perceive that friendly military FDOs are being used as preparation for a
preemptive attack.
(2) Nonmilitary FDOs are preplanned, preemptive actions taken by OGAs to
dissuade an adversary from initiating hostilities. Nonmilitary FDOs need to be
coordinated, integrated, and synchronized with military FDOs to focus all instruments of
national power.
For further guidance on planning FDOs, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.
e. Protection. JFCs must protect their forces and their freedom of action to
accomplish their mission. This dictates that JFCs not only provide force protection, but
be aware of and participate as appropriate in the protection of interagency and regional
multinational capabilities and activities. JFCs may spend as much time on protection as
on direct preparation of their forces for combat.
f. Space Force Enhancement. JFCs depend upon and exploit the advantages of
space capabilities. During the deter phase, space forces are limited to already fielded and
immediately deployable assets and established priorities for service. As the situation
develops, priorities for space force enhancement may change to aid the JFC in assessing
the changing operational environment. Most importantly, the JFC and component
commanders need to anticipate “surge” space capabilities needed for future phases due to
the long lead times to reprioritize or acquire additional capabilities.
g. Geospatial Intelligence Support to Operations. Geospatial products or
services—including maps, charts, imagery products, web services, and support data—
must be fully coordinated with JFC components as well as with the Joint Staff, Office of
SecDef, and the NGA through the JFC’s GEOINT cell. Requests for or updates to
GEOINT products, including maps or annotated imagery products, should be submitted
as early as possible through the JFC’s GEOINT cell to the NGA support team at the
JFC’s HQ. US products should be used whenever possible, since the accuracy, scale, and
reliability of foreign maps and charts may vary widely from US products. In any joint or
multinational operation, the World Geodetic System-1984 should be the common system.
If US products are to be used in a coalition environment or within a multinational HQ,