JP 3-0, page 152

Chapter V V-46 JP 3-0 (4) Successful OPSEC and MILDEC may confuse the adversary and ease forcible entry operations. OPSEC helps foster a credible MILDEC. Additionally, the actions, themes, and messages portrayed by all friendly forces must be consistent if MILDEC is to be believable. (5) SOF may precede forcible entry forces to identify, clarify, and modify conditions in the lodgment. SOF may conduct the assaults to seize small, initial lodgments such as airfields or seaports. They may provide or assist in employing fire support and conduct other operations in support of the forcible entry, such as seizing air fields or conducting reconnaissance of landing zones or amphibious landing sites. They may conduct special reconnaissance and direct action well beyond the lodgment to identify, interdict, and destroy forces that threaten the conventional entry force. OPERATION JUST CAUSE In the early morning hours of 20 December 1989, the Commander, US Southern Command, Joint Task Force (JTF) Panama, conducted multiple, simultaneous forcible entry operations to begin Operation JUST CAUSE. By parachute assault, forces seized key lodgments at Torrijos-Tocumen Military Airfield and International Airport and at the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) base at Rio Hato. The JTF used these lodgments for force buildup and to launch immediate assaults against the PDF. The JTF commander synchronized the forcible entry operations with numerous other operations involving virtually all capabilities of the joint force. The parachute assault forces strategically deployed at staggered times from bases in the continental United States, some in C-141 Starlifters, others in slower C-130 transport planes. One large formation experienced delays from a sudden ice storm at the departure airfield—its operations and timing were revised in the air. H-hour was even adjusted for assault operations because of intelligence that indicated a possible compromise. Special operations forces (SOF) reconnaissance and direct action teams provided last-minute information on widely dispersed targets. At H-hour the parachute assault forces, forward-deployed forces, SOF, and air elements of the joint force simultaneously attacked 27 targets— most of them in the vicinity of the Panama Canal Zone. Illustrating that joint force commanders organize and apply force in a manner that fits the situation, the JTF commander employed land and SOF to attack strategic targets and stealth aircraft to attack tactical and operational-level targets. The forcible entry operations, combined with simultaneous and follow-on attack against enemy command and control facilities and key units, seized the initiative and paralyzed enemy decision making. Most fighting was concluded within 24 hours. Casualties were minimized. It was a classic coup de main. Various Sources