JP 3-0, page 96

Chapter IV IV-4 JP 3-0 capabilities outside the AOR that are crucial to successful joint operations. These capabilities typically reside at USG facilities such as military reservations, installations, bases, posts, camps, stations, arsenals, vessels/ships, or laboratories, which support joint functions such as C2, intelligence, and sustainment. Although DOD installations normally lie outside the designated operational area and area of influence, they are part of the JFC’s operational environment. For example, the JFC requires force visibility throughout deployment to the completion of reception, staging, onward movement, integration, and redeployment. DOD installations provide support to deployed forces until they return. The ability to receive support from DOD installations can reduce the size of the forward deployed force. To a significant degree, events occurring at DOD installations affect the morale and performance of deployed forces. Thus, the JFC’s operational environment encompasses all “home station” installation functions, including family programs. Although not depicted in Figure IV-1, the operational environment also includes a wide variety of intangible factors such as the culture, perceptions, beliefs, and values of enemy, adversary, neutral, or friendly political and social systems. e. A Systems Perspective (1) A system is a functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements forming a unified whole. One way to think of the operational environment is as a set of complex and constantly interacting political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII), and other systems as Figure IV-2 depicts. The nature and interaction of these systems will affect how the commander plans, organizes for, and conducts joint operations. The JFC’s interorganizational partners routinely focus on systems other than military (political, economic, etc.), so the JFC and staff must understand these systems and how military operations affect them. Equally important is understanding how elements in other PMESII systems can help or hinder the JFC’s mission. A commonly shared understanding among partners in the operation can help influence actions beyond the JFC’s directive authority and promote a unified, comprehensive approach to achieve objectives. (2) A systems understanding of the operational environment typically will require cross-functional participation by other joint force staff elements and collaboration with various intelligence organizations, USG departments and agencies, and nongovernmental centers that possess relevant expertise. The JFC must consider the best way to manage or support this cross-functional effort. The J-2 is the staff lead for this effort as part of JIPOE. A variety of factors, including planning time available, will affect the fidelity of a systems perspective. (3) Understanding PMESII systems, their interaction with each other, and how system relationships will change over time will increase the JFC’s knowledge of how actions within a system can affect other system components. Among other benefits, this perspective helps intelligence analysts identify potential sources from which to gain indications and warning, and facilitates understanding the continuous and complex interaction of friendly, adversary, and neutral systems. A systems understanding also supports operational design by enhancing elements such as COGs, LOOs, and decisive