JP 3-60, page 66

Chapter II II-36 JP 3-60 are usually immediate and easily recognizable. (For example, an enemy C2 center is destroyed by friendly artillery or a terrorist network courier is captured by a direct action mission.) (2) Indirect effects are the delayed and/or displaced second-, third-, and higher- order consequences of action, created through intermediate events or mechanisms. These outcomes may be physical or behavioral in nature. Indirect effects may be difficult to recognize due to subtle changes in system behavior that may make them difficult to observe. For example, an indirect effect of destroying a communications node or capturing a terrorist cell courier may degrade the effectiveness of the fielded enemy force’s C2 structure. Effects such as this have real benefits, but may be more difficult to assess and measure individually or in the short-term. Although a factor for consideration, difficulty of assessment should not be the primary factor for choosing to create direct or indirect effects. (3) Direct and indirect effects possess many characteristics that can qualitatively shape the operational environment. Several of these are discussed below. (a) Cumulative Effects. Effects tend to compound, such that the ultimate result of a number of direct and/or indirect effects often combine to produce greater outcomes than the sum of their individual impacts. (b) Cascading Effects. Effects can ripple through a targeted system, often influencing other systems. This most typically occurs through nodes and links that are common and critical to related systems. The cascading of direct and indirect effects, as the name implies, usually flows from higher to lower levels. As an example, destruction of a headquarters element or capture of a terrorist senior leader will result in the loss of C2 and thus degrade the effectiveness of subordinate organizations. (c) Unintended Effects. Effects often spill over to create unintended consequences, which may be counterproductive or may create opportunities. An example of a counterproductive consequence entails injury or collateral damage to persons or objects unrelated to the intended target. Conversely, some unforeseen effects may create opportunities that the joint force can exploit to help accomplish objectives. Unintended effects may also occur if the pre-strike analysis was incorrect and the enemy’s reaction differs from what we expected, complicates operations, or causes a change to operations (e.g., we expected enemy withdrawal, but they counterattacked with their strategic reserve instead). The pre-strike analysis may also have miscalculated the local civilian population perceptions/reactions and international public opinion, ultimately resulting in more restrictions on target selection or engagement timing. Planners and targeteers should consider second-, third-, and higher-order effects, especially political-military effects, during planning and assessment. While estimating outcomes is rarely an exact process, estimation becomes increasingly difficult as effects continue to compound and cascade through targets and target systems. In addition, the impact of a single event can often be magnified over time and distance that greatly exceeds the span of the direct effect associated with that one event.