MCRP 12-10B.1, page 353

(4) Night fighting was the most difficult activity for Russian infantry. The Russian infantry, at all levels, was inadequately trained for night operations, and lacked night vision equipment. (5) Armored vehicles cannot operate in cities without extensive dismounted infantry support. The Chechens formed antitank hunter-killer teams equipped with RPG-7 and RPG-18 antitank missiles. They engaged Russian tanks with volley fire from above, behind, and the sides. Armor columns not supported by dismounted infantry suffered great losses. (6) Armored engineer vehicles are indispensable for removing obstacles. The Russians found that armored engineer vehicles were critical to restoring or improving mobility in Grozny. Eventually, the Russians formed special assault groups that included armored engineer vehicles in each group. (7) The Chechens preferred small unit, hit-and-run ambush tactics. The Chechens relied on small units (15 to 20 troops) to conduct quick, sharp ambushes, from which they would disengage before the Russians could bring significant firepower to bear. Ambushes were often conducted in three tiers, with Chechens in the underground, on the ground floor, and on the roof, with each element having a different task in the ambush. They also used ambush tactics against Russian helicopters. (8) Urban combat is extremely workforce intensive, and results in significant attrition of personnel and materiel for the attacker. The Russians discovered that a 5 to 1 workforce ratio was often not enough, due to the high casualty rates consistent with urban combat and the requirement to guard virtually every building taken. (10) Tracked vehicles are preferable to wheeled vehicles in the urban environment. Tracked vehicles provided better mobility than wheeled vehicles due to their significantly greater ability to negotiate obstacles and rubble. (11) Armored vehicles required additional protection (i.e., reactive armor, sandbags, wire mesh, etc.) to negate attacks from the sides, rear, and top. Russian tank design emphasized greater armor protection on the frontal arc, and less on other areas of the vehicle. This proved inadequate for urban combat, where attacks can come from any direction. The majority of lethal hits came from above, easily penetrating turrets and engine decks, and from the rear. (12) The spatial qualities and perspectives of urban combat are more "vertical" than non-urban combat. The Chechens regularly fought from basements, rooftops, and upper-floor rooms, making them difficult to locate and engage. Russians soldiers trained in open areas, had to reorient to a confined, highly vertical environment. Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain J-5