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Military manual MCRP 12-10B.1 Page 355 of 371 text: pdf

MCRP 12-10B.1, page 355

Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)

Marine Corps Reference Publication: Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)

Public distribution statement A; S2 KOCOA cited as MCRP 12-10 b.1

Page 355 of MCRP 12-10B.1
Searchable page text (OCR / PDF)
(7) The Russians found "bunker busting" weapons to be invaluable. The Russians came to rely heavily on "bunker busting" weapons for engaging Chechens, primarily snipers, entrenched in buildings. (8) Russian helicopters needed stand-off weapons, that would allow them to engage targets while outside the range of Chechen weapons. The Chechens employed 23mm cannons and heavy machine guns against Russian helicopters, causing the Russian's helicopter gunships to fire from ranges of 3,000 meters or more. This required the use of wire-guided munitions and large caliber (240mm) rockets. (9) The Russians made extensive use of precision-guided weapons. When the weather allowed, the Russians were able to use precision guided weapons, such as laser-guided bombs and missiles. They had great effect against priority targets such as bridges, major road intersections, and buildings. e. Logistics. (1) Deficiencies in the Russian logistics system degraded combat effectiveness. Significant inadequacies in the Russian logistics apparatus effected virtually all combat forces and operations. Some soldiers actually entered combat in Grozny without weapons or ammunition. The Russian transportation system failed. Supply officers were unprepared for the high volume demands for ammunition, hand grenades, smoke grenades, demolition charges, and one-shot antitank weapons. (2) Russian logistics personnel were ill-prepared in basic soldier skills. Russian infantry often had to be used to conduct logistics operations into Grozny, because the logistics personnel lack the basic skills to defend themselves against the Chechens. (3) The Russian ground forces required special equipment not normally found in unit T/Es. The T/E for the typical Russian infantry unit did not include such items as ropes, grappling hooks, and ladders, all of which proved essential for urban combat. (4) Armored vehicle recovery is extremely difficult and dangerous. The Russians found the recovery of vehicles to be extremely difficult due to the terrain (i.e., narrow streets, rubble and debris), and Chechen opposition. (5) Some Russian equipment was modified in the field to counter Chechen tactics and equipment. The Russians had to adopt add-on armor for their vehicles. They fabricated metal screens and wire mesh guards, which helped to defeat RPG and Molotov cocktail attacks. (6) Medical support was of great importance. Russian casualty evacuation was difficult due to the lack of vehicular mobility, and the vulnerability of helicopters to Chechen fire. Many casualties were psychological, due in great part to the intense, violent nature of Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain J-7