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Chapter 7 7-2 ATP 2-33.4 18 August 2014 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COUNTER-IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE 7-8. (FOUO) Analytic support to counter-improvised explosives device (CIED) operations must facilitate the development of IED networks and nodes and support to targeting those networks. Conducting predictive intelligence in asymmetrical operations has truly proven to be a difficult task. It is improbable, if not impossible, to determine with any degree of certainty that an IED will certainly be detonated at a precise location at a given time; this is regardless of the amount of available data, collection asset, or other information. 7-9. Intelligence analysis is the mental process of receiving and interpreting old and new information (raw data) from designated collection assets as well as from open sources (civilians, Soldiers on the battlefield, or civil affairs), and integrating that information into the overall view of the operational environment. 7-10. (FOUO) Two of the basic types of analysis used at all echelons in CIED operations are individual component analysis and nodal component analysis. Both types of analysis can be subdivided into near-, intermediate-, and long-term analysis.  Individual component analysis actions focus on what the individual (the one) is doing near, intermediate, and long term.  Nodal component analysis actions focus on multiple people of importance in an AO; this analysis develops an understanding of interrelationships between them and the ideas and beliefs driving their actions. 7-11. (FOUO) Both types of analysis differ in that individual component analysis information provides threat warning and metrics of enemy capabilities, while nodal component analysis provides intelligence for network targeting. 7-12. (FOUO) Once the analyst has determined how the IED network is constructed, it is also important to understand how the various activity nodes interact with one another. The goal is to produce a model of the threat IED operations that captures the processes present in the threat IED network. Intelligence briefs on threat activity within each node should be analyzed to produce signatures and vulnerabilities. This mapping will produce a list of capability gaps that will be the basis for funding priorities. 7-13. (FOUO) Figure 7-1 is an example of an IED activity model. For purposes of this illustration, analytic techniques successfully employed are functional analysis, link analysis, modeling, pattern analysis, situational logic, and network analysis. Table 7-1, which is not all-inclusive, lists possible nodes located in an IED network. Some IED networks will contain each node listed; others may have more nodes or not include nodes. Analysts must understand each node will be structured differently. 7-14. An analyst must determine what is moving between elements and nodes; how actions are executed; and how much materiel is being transferred. (Refer to chapter 5 for a discussion on link analysis, pattern analysis, situational logic, and network analysis. See FM 2-01.3 for more information on functional analysis and modeling.) 7-15. Once modeling has taken place, the result should assist in understanding a specific AO for a specific snapshot in time. The models are constantly evolving and can be adapted by the analyst to assist in understanding any operational environment.