ATP 2-33.4, page 113
Intelligence Analysis
Army Techniques Publication: Intelligence Analysis
2014 public edition (Archive.org)
Searchable page text (OCR / PDF)
Emerging Analytic Techniques
18 August 2014
ATP 2-33.4
A-9
partners; in the government domain it might include the policy actions or the behavior of allies
or adversaries.
Assess how each of these forces could affect the analytic problem.
Determine whether these forces actually do have an impact on the particular issue based on the
available evidence.
RED TEAM ANALYSIS
A-54. Frequently, analysts face the challenge of forecasting how a foreign leader or decisionmaking group
may behave when it is clear there is a risk of falling into a “mirror-image” problem. That is, analysts can
sometimes believe a foreign leader has the same motives, values, or understanding of an issue that they
hold. Traditional analysis sometimes assumes that foreign leaders or groups will behave rationally and act
as the analysts would if faced with the same threats or opportunities. History has shown that foreign leaders
often respond differently to events because of different cultural, organizational, or personal experiences.
Facts
A-55. Red Team analysis tries to consciously place analysts in the same cultural, organizational, and
personal setting (“putting them in their shoes”) in which the target individual or group operates. Whereas
analysts normally work from the position of the blue (friendly forces), a red team of analysts attempts to
work in the environment of the hostile forces.
A-56. Like devil’s advocacy and Team A/Team B techniques, Red Team analysis is aimed at freeing the
analyst from the prison of a well-developed mindset; in this case, the analyst’s own sense of rationality,
cultural norms, and personal values. Whereas analysts usually operate as observers of a foreign threat, the
Red Team technique transforms the analyst into an enemy operating within the threat’s culture and political
milieu. This form of role-playing is useful when trying to replicate the mindset of authoritarian leaders,
terrorist cells, or other nonwestern groups that operate under very different codes of behavior or
motivations.
A-57. Often this technique can introduce new or different stimuli that might not have been factored into
traditional analysis, such as the target’s familial ties or the international political, economic, and military
pressures felt by the individual. For example, Red Team participants might ask themselves: “What would
my peers, family, or tribe expect me to do? Alternatively, a Red Team analyst might pose the question to
his colleagues: “How do we perceive the external threats and opportunities?” Finally, the Red Team
technique can factor into its analysis the way in which personal power and status might influence a target’s
behavior.
The Method
A-58. Red Team analysis is not easy to conduct. It requires significant time to develop a team of qualified
experts who can think like the threat. The team has to distance itself from the normal analysis and work as
though living in the target’s world. Without sophisticated understanding of the culture, operational
environments, and personal histories of the foreign group, analysts will not be able to behave or think like
the enemy. Analysts can never truly escape their own experiences and mindsets, but this technique can at
least prevent them from falling subconsciously into mirror-imaging.
A-59. On issues that lend themselves to Red Team analysis, a manager needs to build a team of experts
with in-depth knowledge of the operational environments, the target’s personality, and the style of thinking
used. The team should be populated with people who might have experienced the culture, shared the ethnic
background, or have worked in similar operational environments. It is desirable, although not absolutely
necessary, to include those who understand the target’s language. Once established and separated from
traditional analysis, the team members should—
Put themselves in the threat’s circumstances and react to foreign stimuli as the target would.
Develop a set of first-person questions that the threat would ask, such as: “How would I perceive
incoming information; what would be my personal concerns; or to whom would I look for an
opinion?”