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Military manual JP 3-0 Page 143 of 204 text: pdf

JP 3-0, page 143

Joint Operations

Joint Publication: Joint Operations

11 August 2011 public edition

Page 143 of JP 3-0
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Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations V-37 since the intent is to limit escalation in the operational area. A JFC might begin to limit stability operations if an adversary’s potential combat actions are imminent. In combat operations, seize the initiative and dominate phases focus on offense and defense. Stability operations are likely restricted to parts of the operational area away from immediate combat, or might not occur at all. As the joint force achieves objectives and combat abates, the focus shifts to actions typical of stabilize and enable civil authority. Stability operations resume and will usually increase in proportion to the decrease in combat as the situation approaches relative peace. (3) Planning for the transition from sustained combat operations to the termination of joint operations, and then a complete handover to civil authority, must commence during plan development and be ongoing during all phases of a campaign or major operation. Planning for redeployment should be considered early and continued throughout the operation and is best accomplished in the same time-phased process in which deployment was accomplished. An unnecessarily narrow focus on planning offensive and defensive operations in the dominate phase may threaten full development of the stabilize and enable civil authority phases and negatively affect joint operation momentum. Even while sustained combat operations are ongoing, it is necessary to establish or restore security and control and provide humanitarian relief as succeeding areas are occupied, bypassed, or transitioned to civilian control. 12. Considerations for Shaping a. General. JFCs are able to assist in determining the shape and character of potential future operations before committing forces. In many cases, these actions enhance bonds between potential multinational partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when required, strengthen future multinational operations, and prevent crises from developing. b. Organizing and Training Forces. Organizing and, where possible, training forces to conduct operations throughout the operational area can be a deterrent. JTFs and components that are likely to be employed in theater operations should be exercised regularly during peacetime. Staffs should be identified and trained for planning and controlling joint and multinational operations. The composition of joint force staffs should reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure that those responsible for employing joint forces have thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. When possible, JFCs and their staffs should invite non-DOD agencies to participate in training to facilitate a common understanding and to build a working relationship prior to actual execution. When it is not possible to train forces in the theater of employment, as with US-based forces with multiple taskings, maximum use should be made of regularly scheduled and ad hoc exercise opportunities. The training focus for all forces and the basis for exercise objectives should be the CCDR’s joint mission-essential task list. c. Rehearsals. Rehearsal is the process of learning, understanding, and practicing a plan in the time available before actual execution. Rehearsing key combat and logistic actions allows participants to become familiar with the operation and to visualize the plan. This process assists them in orienting joint and multinational forces to their