JP 3-60, page 46
Joint Targeting
Joint Publication: Joint Targeting
31 January 2013 public edition
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Chapter II
II-16
JP 3-60
infrastructure and facilities that may be required during later phases of the campaign or
major operation. For example, the JFC may require targeteers to prevent enemy flight
operations while safeguarding the airfield’s capability to support blue force operations once
captured. The employment of nonlethal capabilities, such as public affairs, key leader
engagement, civil-military operations, and military information support operations can help
address these concerns. Nonlethal capability use can also influence adversary decision
maker’s choice of actions, local public condemnation of adversary actions, and directly
impact domestic and international support of the adversary. Nonlethal target engagement
provides the JFC a range of flexible target engagement options. The scalability, selectability,
and responsiveness of nonlethal capabilities provide the JFC the means to engage all target
types: facilities (e.g., to clear a facility of personnel, thus stopping its function), individuals
(e.g., detaining an individual), virtual targets (through cyberspace), equipment (e.g., through
seizure), and organizations (e.g., revoking a license to engage in commerce).
(e) The use of nonlethal capabilities may be particularly desirable when
restraints on friendly weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence characterize the operational
environment. In some cases, even carefully applied force with lethal weapons can result in
negative public perceptions that could adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy
and impede the attainment of both short and long-term goals. Escalation of force guidance in
the form of ROE/rules for the use of force, coupled with appropriate nonlethal capabilities,
can help avoid raising the level of conflict unnecessarily.
(5) CDE is a critical part of the effects estimate step in the joint targeting process
phase 3 (or in the “track” step of phase 5 during dynamic targeting) when munitions are used
on facilities. CJCSI 3160.01, No-Strike and the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology
details a specific CDE process followed Department of Defense (DOD)-wide. Targets with
associated collateral damage concerns expected to exceed theater (combatant command)
thresholds are referred either to SecDef or the President using the sensitive target approval
and review (STAR) process, detailed in CJCSI 3122.06, Sensitive Target Approval and
Review (STAR) Process.
f. Phase 4—Commander’s Decision and Force Assignment
(1) The force assignment process integrates previous phases of joint targeting and
fuses capabilities analysis with available forces, sensors, and weapons systems. Figure II-7
provides a graphic illustration of the flow of this step. It is primarily an operations function,
but requires considerable intelligence support to ensure ISR assets are properly integrated
into the plan. The process of resourcing JIPTL targets with available forces or systems and
ISR assets lies at the heart of force assignment. This process links theoretical planning to
actual operations. Once the JFC has approved the JIPTL, either entirely or in part, tasking
orders are prepared and released to the executing components and forces. The joint targeting
cycle facilitates the publication of tasking orders by providing amplifying information
necessary for detailed tactical-level planning of operations.