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Military manual JP 3-60 Page 46 of 138 text: pdf

JP 3-60, page 46

Joint Targeting

Joint Publication: Joint Targeting

31 January 2013 public edition

Page 46 of JP 3-60
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Chapter II II-16 JP 3-60 infrastructure and facilities that may be required during later phases of the campaign or major operation. For example, the JFC may require targeteers to prevent enemy flight operations while safeguarding the airfield’s capability to support blue force operations once captured. The employment of nonlethal capabilities, such as public affairs, key leader engagement, civil-military operations, and military information support operations can help address these concerns. Nonlethal capability use can also influence adversary decision maker’s choice of actions, local public condemnation of adversary actions, and directly impact domestic and international support of the adversary. Nonlethal target engagement provides the JFC a range of flexible target engagement options. The scalability, selectability, and responsiveness of nonlethal capabilities provide the JFC the means to engage all target types: facilities (e.g., to clear a facility of personnel, thus stopping its function), individuals (e.g., detaining an individual), virtual targets (through cyberspace), equipment (e.g., through seizure), and organizations (e.g., revoking a license to engage in commerce). (e) The use of nonlethal capabilities may be particularly desirable when restraints on friendly weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence characterize the operational environment. In some cases, even carefully applied force with lethal weapons can result in negative public perceptions that could adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short and long-term goals. Escalation of force guidance in the form of ROE/rules for the use of force, coupled with appropriate nonlethal capabilities, can help avoid raising the level of conflict unnecessarily. (5) CDE is a critical part of the effects estimate step in the joint targeting process phase 3 (or in the “track” step of phase 5 during dynamic targeting) when munitions are used on facilities. CJCSI 3160.01, No-Strike and the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology details a specific CDE process followed Department of Defense (DOD)-wide. Targets with associated collateral damage concerns expected to exceed theater (combatant command) thresholds are referred either to SecDef or the President using the sensitive target approval and review (STAR) process, detailed in CJCSI 3122.06, Sensitive Target Approval and Review (STAR) Process. f. Phase 4—Commander’s Decision and Force Assignment (1) The force assignment process integrates previous phases of joint targeting and fuses capabilities analysis with available forces, sensors, and weapons systems. Figure II-7 provides a graphic illustration of the flow of this step. It is primarily an operations function, but requires considerable intelligence support to ensure ISR assets are properly integrated into the plan. The process of resourcing JIPTL targets with available forces or systems and ISR assets lies at the heart of force assignment. This process links theoretical planning to actual operations. Once the JFC has approved the JIPTL, either entirely or in part, tasking orders are prepared and released to the executing components and forces. The joint targeting cycle facilitates the publication of tasking orders by providing amplifying information necessary for detailed tactical-level planning of operations.